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 3 
truly hospitable 
these germans are 
they christened us 
guest workers 
 
-Yüksel Pazarkaya1 
 
 
Introduction 
In the 1960s and 1970s, West Berlin was at the center of the world’s attention. Plagued 
by Cold War divisions, all eyes were focused on the city’s seemingly miraculous physical and 
economic renewal. Modern housing compounds by world famous Bauhaus émigrés drew visitors 
and press attention, and the currency reform of 1948 had seemingly sparked an economic miracle 
(Wirtschaftswunder). However, there is an essential story that is often only a footnote in this 
history of urban renewal: the so-called “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter). From the 1950s until 
1973, Germany recruited thousands of foreign workers from countries like Spain, Yugoslavia, 
and Turkey to temporarily increase their production capacity. The workers were hired upon a 
rotation principle – after just a few years, they were to return home and make space for new 
recruits. Living in dormitories under strict curfews and restrictions, a far cry from the city’s 
modernist housing complexes that advertised freedom and democracy, the Gastarbeiter were 
seen as easily replaceable participants in the German economic miracle. 
This thesis elaborates on the story of West Berlin’s transformation from the 1960s 
through the 1980s by complicating conventional macro-narratives of urban transformations. It 
moves beyond West Berlin’s origin myths in order to acknowledge Turkish immigrants as 
central and active agents in West Berlin’s evolution. Drawing on archival research in Germany, 
each chapter approaches West Berlin’s story from two perspectives. First, I discuss big picture 
                                                
1 Yüksel Pazarkaya “gastarbeiter” 1989, DOMiD. 
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changes in the city, addressing flashy building expositions and ambitious top-down policy 
initiatives. With this framework in place, each section then zeroes in on the lives of Turkish 
guest workers living in the city. From the long train ride to Germany, to the founding of so-
called “backyard mosques” (Hinterhofmoscheen) and small businesses, these sections round out 
the story of Germany’s island of democracy in the East. It is impossible to fully understand the 
larger-scale changes happening in West Berlin without investigating the influence of the Turkish 
immigrants in the city, and vice versa.  
This entanglement complicates the preconception that Turkish immigrants lived in 
isolated “parallel societies” within German borders. Although Turkish modes of belonging 
diverged from common political definitions of integration, the “guest workers” were never 
simply economic contributors. Since their arrival, Turkish immigrants have influenced their 
surroundings and shaped urban spaces to fit their needs. This happened in conversation with 
German institutions and residents, not in complete isolation. Investigating these tangled 
narratives contributes to a more holistic understanding of the relationship between immigrants 
and their newfound communities.  
Taking Stock and Notes on Methodology 
 In the more than 50 years since Germany began recruiting Turkish ‘guest workers,’ a 
quickly growing body of work has analyzed the success, or more commonly the failure, of 
Germany’s immigration policy. Much of this work, in the fields of sociology, political science, 
and history, seeks to apply either micro- or macro-level theory to the processes of Turkish 
migration and integration.2 Historian Rita Chin, for example, has published enormously 
                                                
2 Influential macro-level works include: Karin Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück--”: die Geschichte der 
türkischen “Gastarbeiter” in der Bundesrepublik (Wallstein Verlag, 2005).; Annika Hinze, Turkish Berlin: 
Integration Policy and Urban Space, Globalization and Community; Volume 21 (Minneapolis: University of 
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influential work studying the role of Turkish cultural elites as well as the roles of democracy and 
race in ‘guest worker’ integration.3 Much of the existing literature has also focused on the period 
post-1973, after recruitment officially ended. For example, several socio-cultural analyses, 
including musicologist Thomas Solomon’s investigation of transnational Turkish-German rap, 
have focused on Turkish identity formation related to “Muslim-ness” in 1990s Germany.4 More 
recently, historians have adopted a more ethnographic-centered Alltagsgeschichte (everyday 
history) approach that addressed the early experiences of ‘guest workers’ in West Germany. In 
2018, for example, historians Sarah Thomsen Vierra and Jennifer Miller both published 
insightful books about Turkish migrants’ lived experiences.5 These two works fold in concepts 
like spatiality and identity-building that I incorporate in this work as well. I draw much of my 
Alltagsgeschichte analytical framework from geographer Patricia Ehrkamp’s spatial analysis of 
1990s Marxloh, a predominantly Turkish neighborhood in Cologne.6 Ehrkamp questions 
assimilationist discourses in order to re-evaluate the interactions between immigrants and 
immigrant-receiving communities.7 
                                                
Minnesota Press, 2013).; Mark E. Spicka, “Guest Workers, Social Order, and West German Municipalities, 1960–
7,” Journal of Contemporary History 54, no. 3 (July 2019): 619–39. 
 Influential ethnographic/Alltagsgeshichte works include: Wolfgang Kil and Hilary Silver, “From Kreuzberg to 
Marzahn: New Migrant Communities in Berlin,” German Politics and Society 24, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 95–
121.; Gökçe Yurdakul, From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations 
in Germany (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2009). 
3 Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).; 
Rita Chin, Eley, Geoff, and Grossman, Atina, After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany 
and Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 
4 Thomas Solomon, “Hardcore Muslims: Islamic Themes in Turkish Rap in Diaspora and in the Homeland,” 
Yearbook for Traditional Music 38 (2006): 59–78. Patricia Ehrkamp, “‘We Turks Are No Germans’: Assimilation 
Discourses and the Dialectical Construction of Identities in Germany,” Environment and Planning A: Economy and 
Space 38, no. 9 (September 2006): 1673–92. 
5 Sarah Thomsen Vierra, Turkish Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany: Immigration, Space, and Belonging 
1961-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).; Jennifer A. Miller, Turkish Guest Workers in 
Germany: Hidden Lives and Contested Borders, 1960s to 1980s (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 2018). 
6 Patricia Ehrkamp, “‘We Turks Are No Germans.’” 
7 Ibid. 
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This project is in close conversation with this evolving research, and contributes to the 
field through a unique presentation of the Gastarbeiter story. The structure is strictly 
chronological, and extends from the moment of recruitment in Turkey to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. I made the conscious decision to move away from a thematic approach in order to 
emphasize the evolution of West Berlin alongside the ‘guest worker’ experience. 8 Each chapter 
approaches a specific time period using two analytical frameworks. The first perspective 
integrates the city- and nation-wide scales; this includes landmark government immigration 
policy, the West German zeitgeist, and trends in West Berlin’s city planning. The second side of 
the story is the Alltagsgeschichte, the everyday experiences of immigrants. These individual 
stories, several of which I found doing archival research, question oversimplified government 
narratives and challenge assumptions enveloped in the ‘guest worker’ myth. 
This thesis is by no means a comprehensive account of what it means, or has meant, to be 
a ‘guest worker’ in Germany. Firstly, this study focuses exclusively on ‘Turkish’ immigrants.9 
This focus is both narrow and broad; narrow in that ‘guest workers’ came from a wide range of 
countries, and broad in that the term ‘Turkish’ can mean many things. Using the term ‘Turkish’ 
is not meant to leave out minority groups like the Kurds, nor is it meant to gloss over 
intracultural differences. It is, unfortunately, a term of convenience in the history that follows. 
Secondly, although this project weaves in broad themes that transcend the city-level, West Berlin 
is the centerpiece. This history is not meant to stand in for other German regions with high 
numbers of immigrants, like the Ruhrgebiet. Berlin is the city where I conducted my research, 
                                                
8In Turkish Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, Vierra divides her analysis onto spaces that 
Turkish ‘guest workers’ encountered in the FRG. 
9 It is important to note that the German government did not use the term ‘migrant’ or ‘immigrant’ to refer to 
Turkish ‘guest workers’ – instead, the term ‘foreigner’ was common. In this project, I choose to use the terms ‘guest 
worker’ in quotation marks, migrant, and immigrant interchangeably. I feel that this reflects the complicated status 
that these people and families had in Germany.  
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and it is also the place where space and power were mostly intimately intertwined in Cold War 
Germany.10 As such it became a central location for the formation of Germany’s post-war 
identity, especially on an international scale.11 It is also home to Kreuzberg 36, a zip code within 
a working class Berlin neighborhood alongside the Berlin Wall, that became the most 
emblematic ‘Turkish’ neighborhood in Germany. Because West Berlin holds so much symbolic 
weight, both for European and Turkish-German histories in the mid- to late-20th century, it is the 
ideal location to dig deeper into the intricate stories behind sweeping narratives.   
Stunde Null, the Wirtschaftswunder, and the Gastarbeiter: West Berlin’s Origin Myths 
In order to contextualize this project, which ties West Berlin’s development to the 
development of the Turkish immigrant community, it is necessary to understand the location of 
the ‘guest worker’ in West Germany’s post-war consciousness. The following section argues that 
three origin myths shaped West Berlin’s post-WWII revival and evolution: Stunde Null (hour 
zero), the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) and the Gastarbeiter (guest worker).12 They are 
myths not in that they are devoid of the truth, but rather in that they are too often stand-ins for 
the more complicated history of West Germany’s long post-war period. 13  Existing literature 
typically addresses each of these critical phenomena in isolation, but without understanding each 
element in the context of the other two, the picture will always be incomplete. As historians Rita 
Chin and Heide Fehrenbach so aptly noted: “As transient beings, labor recruits were not 
associated with such longer-term processes as social reconstruction or democratization.”14 This 
                                                
10 Emily Pugh, Architecture, Politics, and Identity in Divided Berlin (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2014). 
11 Hinze, Turkish Berlin, xxiv. 
12 These myths are not novel – they have been reiterated in many contexts and in many forms. I hope to repurpose 
them to provide context for the location of the imagined ‘guest worker’ in post-war Germany’s history.  
13 For a discussion of the “long post-war” see Tony Judt, Postwar (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). 
14 Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach, “German Democracy and the Question of Differece, 1945-1995, in After the 
Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe, eds. Rita Chin, Eley, Geoff, and Grossman, 
Atina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 107. 
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introduction seeks to draw these connections, showing how entangled “guest worker” 
recruitment was with the Cold War projects of democracy and economic growth. 
Introducing and (Dis)entangling the Three Myths of the Post-War Order 
The first myth of post-war West Germany was Stunde Null (hour zero). At its core, this 
narrative implied that Germany emerged from the devastation of WWII with a blank slate. 
Because levels of physical and psychological destruction during the world war had been so 
horrifying, and so widespread, a primarily forward-looking mindset was appealing. The 
escalating Cold War politics of the 1950s quickly filled in this tabula rasa. The goal of both the 
West and the East was to ground the lofty political ideologies of democracy and communism 
respectively in the everyday actions and lives of citizens – a battle between “ways of life.” 
Because Berlin had been divided into occupation zones after the war, both the Western and 
Eastern blocs used the visibility of Berlin’s cityscape as a weapon in an ideological battle. 15 
In order to instill democratic values in the landscape, the West Berlin Senate supported a 
resurgence of modernist architecture. This wave of modernism touted wide streets perfect for 
cars, more greenspaces, less-dense housing blocks, and segregation of housing from other city 
functions. It sought to leave the old city, known for its blocks of dense tenement apartments, 
behind. Famous architects and public building exhibitions branded modernism as part of West 
Germany’s democratic turn. The enclave was the Schaufenster des Westens, or show window of 
the West, and the world’s eyes were watching.  
The second myth of post-war West Germany was the Wirtschaftswunder (economic 
miracle). After the devastation of war, Germany bounced back economically from the 1950s 
through the 1960s in what was often called a “miracle.” The most common touchpoint for the 
                                                
15 See, for example, Jeffry M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World 
War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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beginning of the economic upswing was (and still is) Minister of Economic Affairs Ludwig 
Erhard’s 1948 currency reform (Währungsreform), which introduced the German mark in West 
Germany. Erhard, under Germany’s first post-war chancellor Conrad Adenauer, introduced West 
Germany to a social market economy.16  
This shift towards a (regulated) free market supported the Cold War projects of the 
Western block, who wanted to hold up a democratic West Germany as a successful example of 
prosperity. It was also essential for Germany’s identity as a nation of innovation and hard work. 
Economic Minister Erhard captured some of this sentiment: “…it was everything besides a 
miracle. It was only consequence of the honest effort of an entire people.” 17 This perception of 
German hard work (Fleiß) withstood the test of time. A 1997 history textbook in Bavaria 
(southern Germany) stated: “The Germans largely generated this miracle themselves, by being 
extremely hard-working and undertaking enormous hardships.”18 This homegrown miracle, 
grounded in the hard work and entrepreneurship of Germans across the country, has dominated 
the memory of the 1950s and 1960s.  
Finally, the third myth of the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) both intersects with and 
undermines the previous two. From the very beginning, recruitment was tied to rebuilding West 
Germany and to the economic miracle. Germany’s guest worker program was a series of bilateral 
                                                
16 Economic historians have questioned the Wirtschaftswunder’s origins in Germany’s Social Market Economy. 
Economic historian Tamas Vonyo has argued that the conditions of war themselves, like a pre-existing industrial 
capacity and a flow of workers from the East, contributed more to the boom than the false specter of the Social 
Market Economy. Additionally, the corporatism of the post-war order benefitted the industry that remained from the 
Nazi state. For more information, see Tamás Vonyó, The Economic Consequences of the War: West Germany’s 
Growth Miracle after 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).; Geoff Eley, Corporatism and the 
Social Democratic Moment: The Postwar Settlement, 1945–1973, ed. Dan Stone, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560981.013.0002. 
17 Ludwig Erhard and Wolfram Langer, Wohlstand für alle, [1. Aufl.]. (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1957), 157.; It is 
worth noting that in the original German, Erhard uses the word “Volk,” which I have translated as “people.”  
18 Part of an exhibit titled “German Myths since 1945” by the Haus der Geschichte museum in Bonn 
https://www.hdg.de/en/haus-der-geschichte/exhibitions/german-myths-since-1945/ 
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agreements; the earliest agreement was with Italy in 1955, and Spain and Greece followed. These 
foreigners joined the immigrants, mostly from the East, who were fueling the German workforce. 
The construction of the Berlin Wall almost overnight in August 1961, and the militarized fence 
running the length of the country, stymied the steady flow of workers from the East. This same 
year, the West German government signed a contract with Turkey – Turkish migrants soon 
became the largest group of foreign workers living in Germany.  
Because the economic need was temporary, the foreign worker program was envisaged as 
temporary as well. The Rotationsprinzip (rotation principle) granted workers short-term contracts 
with German firms on the condition that they would return home after only a couple of years. 
This led to the myth of the Gastarbeiter as an unattached male, a welcome and short-term guest 
who would contribute to Germany in only an economic sense. When the millionth guest worker 
Armando Rodrigues de Sá of Portugal arrived in 1964, and the millionth worker from southern 
Europe Ismail Bahadir came in 1969, their reception reflected this status in the German 
imaginary. Photographers snapped photos of the men on train platforms, and, to display their 
thanks, the German government presented them with a moped and a television set respectively. 
They were symbolic of the economic upswing, not of any permanent change to the country. This 
could not have been further from the truth. 
By researching how Turkish immigrants negotiated with the city around them, 
developing their own identities in conversation with the Gastarbeiter myth, introduces 
interesting perspectives on informal urbanism in relation to the urban planning establishment. It 
is clear that the Turkish population was essential for rebuilding West Berlin outside of the 
Wirtschaftswunder factories, and that the West Berlin government’s grand urban renewal plans 
were ultimately foiled by an ever evolving city. Modernism did not turn out to be the way 
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forward –instead, West Berlin’s important changes were more linked to a diversifying city and a 
changing culture. Urban renewal is one way to rebuild a city. In the central neighborhoods like 
Kreuzberg, however, the influx of immigrants was centrally productive of West Berlin’s new 
form and culture. This “border culture,” nestled between the symbolic wall and the modernist 
icons of democracy, was equally as defining as either of these larger than life motifs.  
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Chapter 1 
An Introduction to Recruitment 
 
 The story of Turkish guest workers starts not in West Germany, but in Turkey itself. The 
existing literature typically glosses over the process of recruitment, but this experience holds 
invaluable information about making the transcontinental move.19 This short chapter clarifies 
common misconceptions about the recruitment process, and then introduces one woman’s 
memories of her trip from Istanbul to West Berlin.  
A series of bilateral agreements between Germany and Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece 
(1960), and Turkey (1961) constituted the beginnings of the ‘guest worker’ program. Early 
analyses of these contracts assumed that they were impulsive and unilateral decisions on the part 
of West Germany in order to quickly boost their labor reserves. Historian Johannes-Dieter 
Steinert’s groundbreaking analysis corrected these misconceptions.20 His research, first 
published in 1995, established the agency of the sending countries in ‘guest worker’ 
recruitment.21 Turkish officials began to consider the potential benefits of emigration around 
1960, when the country forecasted and economic shift away from agriculture.22 Temporary 
emigration would lead to remittances streaming into Turkey, as well as free training for unskilled 
workers, who could eventually return home and boost Turkey’s skilled labor pool.23 Both 
Germany and Turkey, then, had an interest in maintaining a two-year ‘rotation principal’ 
(Rotationsprinzip) that prevented long-term migration to Germany. 
                                                
19 For a notable exception, see Miller, “Turkish guest workers in Germant.” 
20 Johannes-Dieter Steinert, “Migration and Migration Policy: West Germany and the Recruitment of Foreign 
Labour, 1945–61,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 1 (January 2014): 9–27. 
21 Johannes-Dieter Steinert, Migration und Politik: Westdeutschland - Europa - Übersee 1945-1961 (Osnabrück: 
Secolo Verlag, 1995). 
22 Steinert, “Migration and Migration Policy,” 18. 
23 Steinert, “Migration and Migration Policy,” 18.; See also Hunn,“Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück--.” 
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Additionally, both Turkey and Germany played a role in administering the recruitment 
process. The node of recruitment was Istanbul, and three-quarters of Turkish ‘guest workers’ 
made their way to Germany through the offices set up in the city.24 The official Deutsche 
Verbindungsstelle (liaison office), part of the German Employment Ministry, opened there in 
July 1960, and almost immediately thousands came to apply for jobs abroad.25 German firms 
sent contracts to the office, and the Verbindungsstelle set out to find qualified workers to fill the 
positions. This involved skill tests and health examinations for applicants before they signed 
contracts and received work visas. These offices, staffed by Germans, were the first point of 
contact between jobseekers and their future neighbors. 
 
 
Figure 1: Applicants gather outside the German liaison office in Istanbul, 196226 
From Istanbul to West Berlin 
The memories of Filiz Y., one of the first Turkish ‘guest workers’ to arrive in West 
Berlin, illuminates a more personal perspective of the recruitment process.27 Her story also defies 
                                                
24 Yunus Ulosoy, “From Guest Worker Migration to Transmigration: The German-Turkish Migratory 
Movements and the Special Role of Istanbul and the Ruhr,” in Darja Reuschke, Monika Salzbrunn, and Korinna 
Schönhärl, eds. The Economies of Urban Diversity: Ruhr Area and Istanbul (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 76. 
25 Steinert, “Migration and Migration Policy,” 23. 
26 Jean Mohr/DOMiD-Archiv, Köln, BT 0535,0002 
27 I have transcribed this story from an oral interview that the FHXB museum conducted with Filiz Yüreklik. Since 
conducting further research, I have found that this same story appears in most recent histories of guest worker 
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the assumptions of the Gastarbeiter myth – that ‘guest workers’ were male, unattached, unskilled 
laborers whose only prerogative was to make money to send home to Turkey. 
Filiz was 20-years-old when she decided to apply for a job abroad at the employment 
bureau in Istanbul. 28 Over the course of fourteen days, she completed an at times extremely 
uncomfortable bureaucratic process. Something that stood out in her memory was the in-depth 
health examination that was common practice for applicants in Turkey (and in other ‘guest 
worker’ sending countries). Filiz completed a long list of health requirements – a urine sample, 
x-rays, a gynecologist visit, and even a teeth check. 
"I mean, they controlled everything from A to Z, our hair, our feet, our fingers, our nails, 
everything…We were totally naked, only with our underwear during the health 
examinations…It is like they were buying animals"29 
 
 
Figure 2: Invasive health examinations at the German liaison office in Istanbul, 197330 
 
This was a common process for potential workers – their output as workers was at stake 
                                                
recruitment (often under a pseudonym). It seems as if Filiz’s story has become a myth in itself and it is a shame that 
there are not more accessible oral histories from different perspectives. Nevertheless, I find her experiences very 
informative and powerful, especially for questioning dominant assumptions about ‘guest workers.’ 
28 Oral interview conducted by K. Akgün and Martin Düspohl (German language) with Filiz Yüreklik, for an exhibit 
titled “Wir waren die ersten…Türkiye’den Berlin‘e” (2000-2002) at the Friedrichshain Kreuzberg Museum 
Bezirksmuseum Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. Time stamp: 00:12:34  
29 Ibid. Yüreklik 2002  
30 DOMiD-Archiv Photo, Jean Mohr/ DOMiD-Arhchiv, Körln, BT 0536,0001 
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for German firms, and the large number of applicants gave the Verbindungsstelle significant 
discretion as to which workers received visas. For example, the Istanbul office used a spirometer 
to measure the lung volume of potential miners, which was a common job opening in Germany’s 
Ruhrgebiet mining region.31 Filiz, on the other hand, found out that Telefunken’s Berlin factory 
was looking for workers and made a hasty decision to commit to this contract. She started her 
application in September 1964 and set off from Istanbul on November 10th of the same year. In 
1964, she was one of around 5,000 Turkish women who came to Germany through the 
Verbindungsstelle in Istanbul – women made up around 9 percent of the total number of 
workers.32 
Filiz’s family was surprised at her choice to move to Berlin, because she was well-trained 
as a seamstress and had already completed an apprenticeship. Contrary to popular belief, it was 
actually very common for ‘guest workers’ to already have training, especially because German 
firms put out requests for specific professions. For example, in October of 1961 there were 2,421 
outstanding commissions in Istanbul: 59% for metal craftsmen, 25% for miners, 11% for 
builders, and 2% for female textile workers.33 Filiz perceived her move to Germany not solely in 
terms of making money, as is the common perception of ‘guest workers,’ but as a way to gain 
personal freedoms and new experiences.  
This freedom was, however, limited from the moment she began her move. Departing 
from Istanbul’s Sirkeci train station (see Figure 2), Filiz’s mother, two brothers, and aunt came to 
see her off on her journey. In early morning, the train arrived in Sofia, Bulgaria. However, 
having signed contracts, they were unable to disembark the train after the long journey. Filiz 
                                                
31 DOMiD-Archiv, SD 0351,0001 
32 Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück--,” 77. 
33	Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück--,” 61. 	
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describes this feeling: “We were like slaves, because we had a contract.” Unable to even lie 
down, the passengers rested their heads on each other’s shoulders as the train continued north 
through Yugoslavia, arriving in Austria the second night. 
 
Figure 3: A train leaves from the Istanbul-Sirkeci train station, 196434 
 
 There was a sense of a common fate on the train, as passengers swapped food and slowly 
got to know one another. Filiz recalls the drama of the situation as well, remembering the sobs of 
a crying woman who had left her four children behind in Turkey. Her car was full of other 
women – the wagons were divided by gender.35 The train arrived in Munich around dawn, and 
Filiz and seven other women who had also signed contracts with Telefunken continued on to 
their final destination – West Berlin. The train to Hannover was better outfitted than the previous 
train, and when they arrived a woman brought them to a railway mission (Bahnhofsmission) to 
spend the night – Filiz shared a bed with her newfound friend Nica that night, because there were 
too few sleeping spaces. The next morning, all of the women boarded a plane for the very first 
                                                
34 DOMiD-Archiv Köln, E 1211,0001 
35 Original interview in Turkish, 1996 DOMiD-Archiv, Köln, ON 53734; Interviewee Alaattin I. came to Germany 
in 1965 and worked in a factory for a few years before becoming the Kapellmeister des Fanfarenzugs Graf Zeppellin 
in Friedrichshafen. 
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time for a short flight to West Berlin. Finally, touching down in Tempelhof, the women had 
arrived at their final destination. This group of women, some of whom had children at home or 
were educated with career training, defy the generalization of the single male Gastarbeiter.   
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Chapter 2 
Hansaviertel and Heime: Modernist Revival and Guest Worker Dormitories 
 
What kind of a city did Turkish “guest workers” encounter when they came to West 
Berlin in the early 1960s? This chapter contrasts the housing experiences of Turkish workers 
with the modernist, forward-looking building exhibitions that the West Berlin government 
constructed and projected on the world stage. While the city government built a series of 
modernist housing complexes from scratch as evidence of the country’s new beginning and 
economic progress, migrants lived in cramped dormitories that were often the antithesis of West 
Berlin’s modernist showpieces. In order to set up this contrast, the following section explores the 
centerpiece of West Berlin’s post-war modernist turn: the 1957 International Building 
Exhibition, or Interbau. 
Interbau’s mission was to completely rebuild Hansaviertel, a neighborhood that had been 
hard hit during WWII, as an interactive exhibit and as a model for West Berlin’s future 
neighborhoods. But Hansaviertel’s emergence from the rubble was a symbolic rebirth. The 
exhibition was part of a Europe-wide trend to use architecture and urban planning as publicity 
centerpieces during the early years of the Cold War, and the West Berlin Senate explicitly used 
Interbau’s modernist orientation to ground the narratives of “hour zero” and the economic 
miracle in the consciousness of Berliners and the rest of the world.36 They wanted to replace the 
cramped tenement housing of the inner city with new spaces that represented progress and 
democracy; the old was to be left behind (“zero hour”) utilizing new technology and ideas 
(economic miracle).  
                                                
36 Pugh, Architecture, Politics, and Identity in Divided Berlin, 58. 
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Although the Senate marketed Interbau as the “future” of the city for everyone, the 
exhibition was never the reality for much of West Berlin’s population – especially for the ‘guest 
workers’ who arrived shortly after Interbau’s international debut. A closer examination reveals 
how the government and media used workers’ dormitories (Heime) to envelop the Gastarbeiter 
myth in the post-war modernist turn. 
The City of Yesterday: Interbau and Modernism’s Second Chance 
 On July 6th 1957, thousands streamed through West Berlin’s Hansaviertel. Several square 
blocks were part of this public neighborhood exhibition called Interbau, and visitors had come 
from the East and West to experience the new “model city.”37 This small district nestled in the 
middle of Berlin was not just something to admire from afar; it was a curated, interactive 
spectacle meant to involve participants in an experience.38 A show crane and a cable car 
provided areal, 360 degree views of the new Hansaviertel. From this vantage point, the dispersed 
10 story high rises and the meandering green spaces appeared as part of a grand modernist 
panorama.39 Interbau was West Berlin’s crowning exhibit of the 1950s. By its conclusion, around 
1.3 million people had visited the Hansaviertel and participated in the modernity-experience.40  
In reality, the West Berlin Senate’s intended audience was much larger than the number 
of in-person visitors. Interbau was a way to internationally project West Germany’s progress and 
democratic turn; in doing so, Interbau embraced the narratives of “hour zero” and the economic 
miracle as central themes of the exhibition. The Senate did so without resorting to overt 
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propaganda; instead, these ideas were embedded in the conception and implementation of the 
expo.41  
Interbau organizers upheld the ‘hour zero’ myth by explicitly avoiding historical 
references to both West Berlin’s recent Nazi past and the interwar precedent of modernist 
architecture. In order to achieve an exclusively forward-looking aesthetic effect, Interbau 
planners utilized the strategy of complete demolition (Kahlschlagsanierung), which was 
common in Germany’s postwar urban planning establishment. The central targets of destruction 
were the Mietskasernen, or tenement houses. After the war, there were many competing visions 
for the future of the city – but the destruction of the ‘tenement city’ was the single unifying 
factor.42 Politicians and architects were painfully aware of these buildings’ legacies, and Berlin’s 
reputation as a cramped, dark “steinerne Stadt” (stone city).43 Interbau countered this 
architectural heritage. 
It is true that the war demolished much of Hansaviertel years before Interbau took place; 
only 13% of the neighborhood’s housing stock had survived WWII. 44 But it was not a 
completely clean slate. The “rubble” of the Hansaviertel housed 741 people and 20 businesses 
when the complete redevelopment scheme came about.45 Even in cases where the buildings 
themselves were unsalvageable, basements and plumbing systems and street networks remained 
largely viable.46 Traces of the neighborhood’s past as a well-to-do but diverse neighborhood, full 
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of tenement housing blocks, still remained. 47 Therefore, starting completely from scratch was 
not a necessity, but a pointed strategy of Kahlschlagsanierung. 
One compelling example of Interbau’s emphasis on “hour zero” was the West Berlin 
Senate’s demolition of a synagogue on Levetzowstrasse that had formerly served the Hansa 
district’s large Jewish community. 48 During WWII, the Nazis had coopted the synagogue as a 
holding cell for Jews before deportation to concentration or death camps. Now, ten years after 
the end of the war, the Senate ordered it to be torn down; the Interbau exhibit made no mention 
of the neighborhood’s history as a center of Jewish culture, nor did it mention the 
Levetzowstrasse synagogue. 49 The historic nature of the neighborhood was irrelevant to its 
future as the “city of tomorrow.” Specifically, the Jewish tradition and the neighborhood’s Nazi 
past were not part of this vision for the future. This ‘clear-cutting’ was symbolic – it meant 
erasing the neighborhood’s history, and starting over from Stunde Null, hour zero.  
But once the past had been demolished, what was to replace it? Interbau’s answer to this 
question was “modernism.” The central characteristics of architectural modernism were the 
separation between living spaces and work spaces, wider roads for the free movement of cars, 
more green spaces, and hollowed out city blocks. The winning proposal for Hansaviertel 
mirrored all of these characteristics. Green spaces from the adjacent Tiergarten bled into the 
porous Hansaviertel, integrating the modern high rises with the natural world. Winning designer 
Jobst described the housing “like people turned to one another in conversation.”50 Each building 
was an individual, with its own personality and style. Some were 10 story high-rises, some long 
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slabs skimming the ground, others low and tight bungalows. And the model city did not stop at 
single family houses or apartment buildings – every aspect of daily life found its match in the 
community, which comprised two churches, a school, a library, and a movie theatre. 
Although the Interbau exhibit framed modernist architecture as the “future” of West 
Berlin, Interbau and post-war modernism did not simply arise from the rubble of WWII without 
historic precedent. Much of the urban design that gained popularity after the war modelled itself 
after the modernism of the interwar period, a fleeting time of German prosperity and freedom 
often referred to as the “golden twenties.” Inspired by famous architect Le Corbusier’s principle 
of functionalism, the German interwar movement called Neues Bauen (New Building) 
represented the city as chaotic and out of control – urban space called out to be tamed by the 
cool, objective logic of urban planning.51 Perhaps the most prominent example of interwar 
modernism was Walter Gropius’ renowned Bauhaus school, which fused a traditional craft-guild 
education with modern, functional design. The Bauhaus emigres made their modernist mark on 
the international stage, but the rise of National Socialism halted modernism’s success in 
Germany itself. The economic prosperity of the golden twenties was transient and the realities of 
inflation and political turmoil set in. Although the grand plans of the interwar modernists 
(including Corbusier, Wagner, and Taut) never came to fruition, the post-WWII modernist 
moment was a second chance to tame a city, now even more hectic than before.  
The West Berlin Senate also embraced the narrative of the economic miracle in the 
execution of the Interbau exhibit. Evidence of West Germany’s economic success after the 
devastation of war was not only important to encourage homegrown consumption, but also for 
displaying the benefits of democracy on the world stage; the latter was especially important to 
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the Allied forces occupying West Germany. Before construction even started, Interbau 
reproduced themes of democracy and the free market that embraced the “economic miracle” 
narrative. For example, a publicized design ‘competition’ implicitly contrasted the authoritarian 
urban planning of in East Germany. The government committees overseeing Interbau perceived 
open discussion about the city’s future to be politically important, even if every single 
submission ultimately reflected the government’s goal to rebuild the Hansaviertel as a modernist 
centerpiece.52 The international coalition that built the exhibit, more than 60 collaborating 
architects and garden architects spanned 14 countries, was also important for the impression of 
open dialogue.53 This international collaboration mirrored West Germany’s reintroduction to the 
Western market as a competitive hub of growth and ideas.   
The ‘experience’ of technology during the Interbau exhibition was another way for the 
planning committee to support the impression of economic progress in West Germany. First, as 
historian Emily Pugh has noted, Interbau’s visitors did not encounter a polished masterpiece; 
only one-third of the buildings were finished when the exhibit took place that July.54 The process 
of construction itself, evidenced by the half-finished buildings and equipment scattered across 
the neighborhood, was part of the show. It demystified the enormous amount of physical capital 
that went into rebuilding an entire neighborhood from scratch, tying Interbau to Germany’s 
economic growth. Visitors and news media also witnessed the technical ingenuity of the 
exhibit’s architecture in its many stages. Even in the ways that visitors physically moved around 
the exhibit, technology was in the spotlight. The Schaukran (viewing crane) lifted two egg-
shaped baskets into the sky while an elaborate chairlift ferried onlookers around the 
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neighborhood (See Figure 4). From the elevated benches of the chairlift, visitors could see 
tractors still overturning earth and unfinished apartment facades. There were also two VW-trains 
on display – one driving visitors around above ground, one sitting in a Hansaviertel subway 
tunnel alongside an exhibit about traffic. A central theme of Interbau, and post-war modernism in 
general, traffic circulation represented a new way for people to interact with the city.55 These 
technological aspects of the exhibit emphasized the economic progress of West Germany. 
 
 
Figure 4 Chair lift gives visitors a bird's eye view; viewing crane inscribed with the phrase "MONTE AU CIEL" (ascended to 
heaven)56 
Ultimately, Interbau displays how the West Berlin Senate’s priority was to embrace and 
reproduce the two founding myths of post-war West Germany: “hour zero” and the economic 
miracle. This project was not centrally focused on bringing affordable and replicable housing 
projects to every city resident. In fact, Hansaviertel’s reconstruction betrayed the Senate’s own 
policies for affordable housing construction. The housing market in the 1950s was extremely 
reliant on public funding for construction projects; 79.7% of housing construction funds came 
from the city’s public coffers.57 As a result, the Senate stipulated that, in exchange for funding, 
all of the public-private projects had to offer apartments within a specific range of affordability.58 
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Interbau’s modernist landscapes overshot these limitations. The cost of the apartments per square 
meter in Hansaviertel was well above that of the average social housing project.59  
The building committees purposefully withheld this financial information until after the 
exhibition’s unveiling, but it did not remain unnoticed for long. The month of the exhibit, an 
article in the popular German magazine Der Spiegel questioned Interbau’s compliance with 1953 
and 1956 laws that dictated the stipulations attached to public construction money.60 Well over a 
year after Interbau’s unveiling, in October 1958, a crowd of over 500 people gathered in West 
Berlin’s Congress Hall to obtain information about the financial backing of Interbau.61 The 
Interbau representatives defended the project’s cost as a “one-time” expense – the first time is 
always more expensive, they claimed, as architects and politicians work out the kinks. This 
explanation omitted the the extra value, in the form of international media attention, that the 
West Berlin Senate gained from the exhibit.  
The claims that Interbau made were radically universal. Hansaviertel was supposed to be 
a model for future development, enrolling everybody in the modernist mission to bring order to 
the city.62 But even in its own small nook of Berlin this vision was shaky. While the former 
Hansa neighborhood housed 6,500 residents, the new “city of tomorrow” only had enough space 
for around 3,500 – this was a sacrifice to increase the ratio of building-to-greenspace from 1:1.5 
to 1.5:5.63 A new neighborhood, with less and more expensive housing stock than its previous 
incarnation, was simply not replicable on the city-scale and did not meet the needs of West 
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Berlin. Hansaviertel and other modernist housing complexes of the mid-20th century were 
supposed to model West Berlin’s future, and in doing so they ignored its present. 
West Berlin’s Worker Dormitories 
In the years after West Berlin embarked on a modernist public relations campaign that 
included the Interbau exhibit, thousands of ‘guest workers’ entered the city to live in cramped 
and isolated dormitories. This contradiction was inherent to the prevailing narrative of 
recruitment that addressed foreign workers not as people, but as economic fuel. Historian Rita 
Chin has described this as a “market discourse.” 64 The ideal Gastarbeiter was male, single, 
unattached to Germany, and ‘rotational.’ Building on previous scholarship, I argue that West 
German political rhetoric wound the Gastarbeiter myth into the pre-existing narratives of 
progress and economic success that I have discussed in previous sections. The dormitories that 
most guest workers lived in throughout the 1960s are evidence of this entanglement, as well as of 
the challenges that ‘guest workers’ posed to the post-war narratives of “hour zero,” economic 
progress, and democracy. 
The contracts that ‘guest workers’ signed before coming to West Germany typically 
included housing arrangements alongside the terms of employment, so once migrants arrived in 
Germany they usually moved into a company-owned dorm (Arbeitnehmerwohnheim, or Heim for 
short).  Housing conditions varied widely by locale and employer, but most were repurposed 
structures ranging from former student dormitories to wartime prison or labor housing.65 
Historian Jennifer Miller has traced these company dormitories to West Germany’s housing 
shortage in the post-war period; it was in the government’s interest to prevent extra pressure on 
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local housing markets by requiring companies to provide housing themselves.66 This policy 
relieved foreigners from having to navigate housing markets, but also left them with little room 
to make independent decisions about their housing.  
Modern Evidence of Economic Progress? Poor Conditions in Heime 
Interestingly and unexpectedly, the German firms and the news media occasionally used 
Heime as further evidence of West Germany’s architectural and economic progress. This theory 
builds on historian Sarah Vierra’s research, which found that German companies like Siemens 
often promoted their dorm apartments as “‘cozy and beautiful rooms’” with common kitchens 
and laundry rooms full of the newest home technologies.67 The dorms were, after all, a large 
investment project across the country: in 1960 the construction budget for the dormitories was 
one hundred million German marks, and in 1963 they allocated double that amount.68  
A specific example of this rhetoric was the renovation of an employee dormitory in 
Berlin’s southeast locality Friedenau. When the Heim on Grazer Damm opened in December 
1963, newspaper articles touted the project as an architectural success. Designers had 
transformed former business offices into 300 “modern” housing units, perfectly situated for the 
44,000 foreign workers that had arrived in Berlin thus far.69 The Senate and the news media also 
used these new workers’ quarters as evidence of the collaboration between government financing 
and free enterprise, another centerpiece of the recently inaugurated social market economy. In 
this way, local officials and news outlets attempted to control the narrative of the dormitories to 
fit the ideals of modernism and progress. 
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Upon closer inspection, the Heim on Grazer Damm betrayed the media’s rosy portrayal. 
Unlike the buildings in Interbau’s Hansaviertel, which incorporated the modernist principles of 
light, air, and green space, the Grazer Damm dorm actually hailed from the period of National 
Socialism. Built between 1938 and 1940, the settlement (Siedlung) on Grazer Damm consisted of 
uniform and stiff five-story buildings, with none of the balconies typical of interwar 
modernism.70 Looming on both sides of the street, the stark building fit with Nazi architect 
Albert Speer’s monumental vision for the “Welthauptstadt Germania” – not with the modern 
“city of tomorrow.” In July 1964, Bild magazine editorial staffer Kurt Lüsebrinck wrote a 
concerned letter to the Senator of Labor and Social Affairs about the Grazer Damm dormitory.71 
Lüsebrinck had talked with a “Gastarbeiter,” a term which he himself puts in quotation marks, 
named Melzer who lived in Arbeitnehmerwohnheim II Grazer Damm 127a. Melzer lived in a 
room of about 18.5 square meters that he shared with two other workers, for which each of them 
paid 65 DM every month. Lüsebrinck described the dormitory as, without exaggeration, close to 
a barrack. He also noted the number of rules for residents, including mandatory house meetings. 
In response to Lüsebrinck’s complaint, the Senator rejected the term “barracks” and continued to 
emphasize the modernity of the Heim.72 The Senator’s response focused on the “cozy and 
suitable design of the rooms,” including light-colored wallpaper that matched the curtains and 
modern furniture. The letter also emphasized the communal living spaces available, like reading 
rooms and kitchens.  
In the following years, more people placed complaints about Grazer Damm 127a. During 
a visit to Grazer Damm 127a in October of 1969, the Youth Social Services found that most of 
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the kitchen stovetops were not working, and that there were many other necessary repairs.73 The 
note mentioned that the dorm made “a poor impression.” In February of the following year, an 
angry postcard addressed to the Senator for Labor, Health, and Social Services described the 
dorm conditions in reviling detail.74 According to the scrawled note, the rent prices were 
“profiteering,” with three men per room, each paying 240 DM for “soiled matresses” (“bespiste 
und bekotste und beschissene Matratzen.”) At the end of the short postcard, written in broken 
German sentences, the resident stated: “An advertisement for Berlin!!!” Grazer Damm is an 
important reminder that for many parts of West Berlin, there was no starting from scratch, from 
Stunde Null. Remnants of the city’s past remained engrained in the physical landscape. The 
majority of guest workers who came to West Berlin in the 1960s lived in the midst of this 
history, in what remained of the city after the battle was over. I will expand on this trend in 
chapter 3, when I investigate home life outside of the dormitories.  
Towards Democracy? Isolation and Control in Heime 
Just as businesses and companies used themes of modernism and technology to control 
the rhetoric surrounding dormitory construction, they also used dormitories as a way to ground 
the myth of the economic and unattached Gastarbeiter. The company-owned Heime ultimately 
gave businesses and the West German government a lot of sway over the daily lives of ‘guest 
workers.’ For one, the dorms were often spatially isolated from host communities, as the main 
priority was for workers to live near the workplace. Even when Heime were proximal to existing 
cities or neighborhoods, as was often the case in West Berlin, strict curfews for all tenants 
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limited any interactions with Germans or community members. This isolation supported the 
narrative that the ‘guest workers’ were solely in Germany as economic fuel.  
Secondly, the dormitories consciously limited any cross-gender interactions in order to 
prevent relationships or familial ties from forming. Companies strictly separated male and 
female apartments, and no visitors of the opposite gender were allowed into the dorms. Historian 
Jennifer Miller found additional evidence of this in “Hallo Mustafa!”, a guide book that the West 
German government published in Turkish for foreign workers in the 1960s: “It is not true, that 
women are always the best use of time. Every meeting with a woman demands tact and good 
manners. I would also like to warn you about sexually transmitted diseases, but that matter 
mainly for a specific category of women.”75 The gender-divided dormitories, that discouraged 
any relationship-building, were a way for West Germany to maintain the image of workers as 
‘unattached’ and single. 
These themes feature prominently in the memories of Filiz Y., the Turkish woman whose 
train ride from Istanbul to Berlin was featured in the introductory chapter.76 Filiz had a contract 
with Telefunken, a West German telephone company, and when she arrived at the West Berlin 
airport, her Turkish home director (Heimleiterin) was waiting to escort her to her new home. The 
Telefunken residence hall was located in Kreuzberg, and seemed to Filiz to be a normal 
apartment building. However, the house rules were certainly out of the ordinary for an apartment 
in democratic Berlin. A universal curfew of 10 p.m. on weekdays and midnight on the weekends 
significantly restricted the women’s freedom of movement. Furthermore, there were no guests 
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allowed in the dormitories, restricting the social relationships that the women had – men were 
especially “taboo,” but even female friends were not allowed. In order to cope with her restricted 
movement and relationships, Filiz imagined that she was a student going to school during the day 
and coming home to sleep in a “boarding school” (Internat).77  Although Filiz’s experiences 
cannot possibly represent the broad range of dormitory conditions, they do bring to light factors 
that united most Heime: overcrowded sleeping and living spaces, strict rules and oversight, and 
separation by gender. 
These conditions were essential for upholding the Gastarbeiter myth. The rules and 
isolation of the Heime molded the migrants’ actions to fit the preconceived image of an 
unattached, low-skilled worker who was part of West Germany’s ‘economic miracle’ and pivot 
towards democracy. The next chapter delves deeper into the 1960s in West Berlin, and pulls out 
how migrants reacted to their living conditions and often resisted the expectations of the 
Gastarbeiter myth both from within, and outside of, the dormitories.  
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Chapter 3 
Urban Renewal and Life on the Border in the 1960s: Remaking the City from Above and 
Below 
 
Turkish workers influenced West Berlin from the moment they arrived in 1961. Although 
the Heime molded workers to fit the Gastarbeiter myth, Turkish communities began to challenge 
this narrative within, and outside of, these limiting spaces. This agency is too often missing in 
existing literature, which tends to focus on the 1970s as the absolute starting point of Turkish 
influence on West Germany.78 This oversimplification ignores the earlier experiences of workers 
navigating their uncertain identities in a divided West Berlin. Although the available primary and 
secondary source materials on the early years of recruitment are regrettably scant, it warrants a 
brief discussion here and certainly more future inquiry. 
In addition to acknowledging this early influence of Turkish guest workers, the 1960s 
were a time of immense spatial change for the city of West Berlin as a whole. The Turkish 
Gastarbeiter arrived in a divided city. When the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, entire parts of the 
city were transformed into borderlands overnight. The West Berlin city government saw these 
neighborhoods, which the city’s division had thrown into stark relief, as an opportunity to 
continue Interbau’s modernist agenda. This chapter demonstrates how this ambitious top-down 
endeavor ultimately failed to reinvigorate West Berlin’s inner city. Instead, these 1960s urban 
renewal policies primed neighborhoods for an influx of Turkish migrants who negotiated their 
identities outside of workers’ dormitories as longer-term residents of the city. 
Renewing the Inner City 
For the rest of the world, the Berlin Wall was symbolic. It represented the hardening of 
two Cold War camps and irreconcilable political differences between East and West Germany. 
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But the physical structure also had very tangible effects on West Berlin’s inner city 
neighborhoods-turned-borderlands. The Berlin Wall was a physical fact of life. It infringed upon 
parts of Kreuzberg and Neukölln, squeezing districts that were already slowly leaking residents 
(See Figures 5 and 6). The population in Kreuzberg, for example, had fallen 6.2% between 1956 
and 1961, while the average population loss across Berlin neighborhoods was only 1.1% during 
this same time period. These neighborhoods were traditionally working class and still consisted 
of the tenement housing (Mietskasernen) that the modernist Interbau exhibit had hoped to 
eradicate from the cityscape. The wall exacerbated the already dilapidated neighborhoods. Those 
who could do so continued the exodus, many moving to newer housing complexes, leaving the 
poor and the elderly behind.79  
 
Figure 5 A map of Berlin's neighborhoods, divided by the Berlin Wall. Note Kreuzberg’s position on the border, 
alongside the wall.80 
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Figure 6: A street view of the Berlin Wall in Kreuzberg81 
The Berlin city government noticed the sinking population in these inner city 
neighborhoods and feared “Slumbildung” (slum formation) and further decay.82 The Social 
Democratic Party, under the leadership of charismatic mayor Willy Brandt, embarked on a 
mission to restore vitality to the inner city. A 1961 government investigation deemed 470,000 
pre-WWI houses in need of renewal and 430,000 in need of repair or demolition.83 Less than two 
years after the wall went up, on March 18th 1963, Brandt officially announced a new program of 
Stadterneuerung (urban renewal). This project was set to renovate six Berlin neighborhoods: 
Tiergarten, Wedding, Kreuzberg, Charlottenburg, Schöneberg and Neukölln. The Kreuzberg 
District Mayor Abendroth ambitiously announced that within the next ten years the 
neighborhood would be “completely redesigned” (“vollig neu gestalten”).84  
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From a political perspective, these neighborhoods were the perfect chance to make a 
statement about West Germany’s successful future-oriented development. The Berlin Wall had 
thrown the city’s political division into concrete relief on the world stage, and urban renewal was 
a way for the city government to represent the West’s economic and political process in stark 
contrast to those of the East. The physical proximity of the two Berlins made for a black and 
white comparison.   
The city government utilized the same principles as the Interbau project of the 1950s, 
drawing on postwar modernism to physically portray democracy and technological progress. 
They wanted to rid the inner city of mixed use areas, integrate light and air into crowded blocks, 
and hollow out dense streets. In a June 1964 speech in front of the Berlin House of 
Representatives, the Social Democratic Senator of Building und Housing Schwedler stated: 
“Berlin has a worldwide reputation as a ‘stone city.’ The rear buildings (Hinterhäuser)  
 and light shafts of the Berlin tenement houses are presented to generations of architecture  
 students as a warning and as a bad example…"85 
 
The West Berlin government recognized the international importance of the cityscape. 
Schwedler saw Berlin’s future in the genius designs of Mies van der Rohe and Walter Gropius, 
banished architects who would come back to destroy the alleys and courtyards that were so 
infamous as to be pedagogical warnings.86  
 In order to implement these modernist principles in the decaying inner city, the city 
government saw the greatest potential value in Kahlschlagsanierung (complete renewal). Early 
city reports deemed the partial renovation of decades old inner city buildings to be 
“uneconomical and unsatisfactory in effect.”87 This statement indicates that economic 
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considerations were only part of the calculus. The tenement housing represented the past and no 
amount of renovations could have altered this ingrained perception; complete demolition thus 
trumped the preservation of existing structure or materials.  
The Social Democratic Party shared this vision of demolition with a broad “growth 
coalition” consisting of public housing companies and banks.88 This public-private partnership 
was essential for carrying out the urban renewal project. The city provided funding for the 
projects, offering more money for complete demolition than for repairs. 89 This incentivized 
housing companies to purchase property with the end goal of tearing down the buildings and 
starting over from scratch.  
The process often stalled before demolition ever took place, however, and the tenement 
houses waited in limbo. In the meantime, landlords and real estate developers rented the 
dilapidated properties to vulnerable populations (like foreign workers) looking for low-rent 
options.90 Housing companies saw these transitory residents as easy profit; the companies 
collected rent without having to invest in or renovate the soon-to-be rubble. In the foreseeable 
future, the guest workers would move back to Turkey, and the Berlin government could 
transform Kreuzberg and other inner city neighborhoods into modernist centerpieces of a 
democratic city.  
This transformation never occurred. Despite ambitious talk of rebuilding the inner city, 
much of the economic and international focus during this time period was on higher-profile 
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projects. In 1963, for example, the city government built a new cultural center to replace the 
former museum island, which had been choked by the city’s division. 91 It poured resources into 
an impressive state library and museums.92 These city centerpieces showcased Prussian artifacts 
and heritage in West Berlin, serving as new focal points to “counteract the ‘decay of the inner-
city areas.’”93 Other modernist housing projects also occupied large amounts of the growth 
coalition’s time and money. The towering apartment buildings of the brand new Märkisches 
Viertel, Gropiusstadt, and Falkenhagener Feld formed a modernist ring around the city.94 
The tall towers of the new modernist housing developments were ideally situated to 
house the thousands of residents fleeing the tenement neighborhoods. According to urban 
planner Harald Bodenschatz, this specific migration flow from the crumbling inner city to the 
modernist ring was far from accidental.95 The building developers capitalized on the Berlin Wall 
and urban renewal programs as an impetus for moving residents to their newer developments – 
they needed to fill spaces in their large and more expensive new communities. By labelling those 
six inner city neighborhoods as “Sanierungsgebiete,” they sped up the evacuation. Only those 
with few options remained.  
West Berlin’s inner city changed drastically during the 1960s, as the Berlin Wall 
explicitly altered the city’s spatial flow and redirected attention to the new border. The Social 
Democrats and private developers positioned themselves to transform insulated borderlands into 
the “city of the future,” a display of democracy and progress. However, upon closer inspection, 
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these projects were unrealistic from the start. The model of total demolition was simply not 
feasible, especially given the high demand for affordable housing in West Berlin – by 1969 only 
1,976 new homes had been built, which was nowhere near the target.96 The growth coalition and 
urban renewal did, however, leave the border districts wide open for change. District Mayor 
Abdendroth’s prediction that Kreuzberg would be “completely redesigned”  (“vollig neu 
gestalten”) within ten years did come true, but not solely through the modern building projects 
that he predicted.97 Instead, the residents who moved into inner-city neighborhoods like 
Kreuzberg became agents of urban renewal in their own right. 
Changes from Below: Questions of Permanence and a New Border Culture 
 
When landlords in urban renewal districts rented their apartments to Turkish immigrants, 
it was under the assumption that the ‘guest workers’ would soon return home. In the 1960s and 
1970s, this was a common understanding among both Germans and migrants themselves. Neither 
party perceived the migration to be permanent. The institutions that the West German 
government established for migrants reflected this ‘temporary’ status, as the previous chapter’s 
discussion of Heime indicated. But this supposition of temporariness coexisted with another 
circumstance: the rotation principle was not enforced throughout most of the 1960s. As a result 
of this contradiction, the resources available did not match the needs of many migrants who 
wound up staying on in Germany year after year. This section investigates how Turkish workers 
reacted to these contradicting aspects of recruitment policy and traces ‘guest worker’ resistance 
from the Heime to religious spaces in West Berlin’s inner city neighborhoods.  
It is first important to expand on the practical failures of the rotation principle – why did 
Turkish ‘guest workers’ stay longer than their initial 2-year contracts? The bilateral agreement 
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that Germany and Turkey signed in 1961 spelled out the 2-year contractual limitation, which also 
included a prohibition on family reunification. In 1961 this was in the interest of both countries: 
Turkey wanted to train its population abroad before bringing them home to work, and Germany 
wanted a temporary, flexible workforce to support the economic miracle.98 All parties involved 
soon recognized the inefficiency of the rotation principle. By as early as 1962 it was clear that 
Turkey’s plan to train unskilled abroad was largely ineffective; that year, around around 47% of 
the Turkish ‘guest workers’ that German companies hired through recruitment offices were 
skilled, which was significantly higher than in other recruitment countries like Italy and Spain.99 
Turkey’s priorities also shifted to increasing out-migration, as their population continued to grow 
and unemployment in cities increased.100 This caused the country to reconsider the original 
contract’s restrictions. 
From the perspective of German companies, shorter contracts meant sending trained 
workers home too quickly. And for migrants living in Germany, who had started a job and 
developed relationships both within and outside of the Heime, it was difficult to leave after only 
two years. Both German companies and Turkish migrants complained about the 2-year limit to 
the Federal Labor Service (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit).101 Eventually, German government 
agencies also came around to the idea of altering the 1961 contract to reduce restrictions. The 
Ministry of Economy (Wirtschaftsministerium) maintained that, because limited housing could 
serve as a natural check on family reunification, the government should avoid the bad press of 
limiting Turkish family reunification.102 Other arguments from German agencies included that 
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the Spanish and Greek guest workers could already bring their families, and that Turkish workers 
had made public complaints early in 1962 about unfair treatment in comparison to these other 
groups of ‘guest workers.’103 After deliberations, West Germany and Turkey signed a new 
contract on April 30th 1964 that removed the ‘rotation principle’ and the clause restricting family 
reunification. 
These policy changes did not, however, significantly alter the infrastructures available for 
Turkish workers while they worked in Germany. The myth of the ‘temporary’ guest worker 
lingered ideologically even after the end of the rotation principle. As the previous chapter 
discussed, most ‘guest workers’ had no choice but to live in the workers’ dormitories 
(Arbeitnehmerwohnheime). The dorms were meant to be transit zones, impermanent homes. 
They took on new meaning after the legal limits of the rotation principle had been officially 
lifted. Without the limits of the original 1961 contract, the curfews, rules, and isolation inherent 
to the dorms were essential for preventing any long-term connections between workers’ and their 
new communities. The dorms continued to enforce the myth of the unattached ‘worker.’  
Within the rule-bound dormitories, however, there were frequent opportunities for 
migrants to reject their limiting identity as ‘workers.’ Historian Jennifer Miller has addressed 
how “…workers made dormitories their homes when they took steps to create a social 
environment, carved out private time, and broke rules about visitors.”104 The dorms’ lack of 
privacy, which in many instances felt oppressing, was also a chance for more social interaction. 
Far from home and family, Heime were often the social nodes of workers’ lives. Immigrants 
formed groups of friends and support systems within the dorms. According to one interview, 
some dorm residents resisted curfew restrictions by spending the weekend away and coming 
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home for the Monday curfew.105 These small patterns of resistance indicate that even this spatial 
control of the ‘guest worker’ population was not enough to completely prevent more substantive 
interaction with the cities and communities that migrants lived in.  
Many migrants also looked for housing outside of the company-sponsored Heime. The 
dormitories appealed to foreign workers with the stable rents and accessibility, but the return on 
the monthly rent was low. Cramped sleeping and cooking quarters were less than ideal, even for 
workers centrally focused on earning a living. Filiz Y., the woman who came to West Berlin to 
work for Telefunken, found herself in this situation in 1966.106 By this time, Filiz had met her 
future husband in Berlin. She decided to leave Telefunken and the accompanying living 
arrangements in order to found the first Turkish flat-share community in Berlin with her 
significant other and two friends. In Filiz’s words, they wanted their own roof over their 
heads.107 They quit their jobs at Telefunken and signed contracts with new firms (without dorms) 
on their own initiative; Filiz worked for a textile manufacturer for a short time, and then spent 
five years in plastic manufacturing for Robert Bosch. Filiz resisted the restrictions of the 
company-owned Heime by founding her own flat-share and seeking out her own employment in 
the city. Her experience also shows how the relationships that migrants formed often threatened 
the ‘myth’ of the unattached worker.  
Filiz’s memories also counter histories that only acknowledge Gastarbeiter identity-
building after family reunification in the 1970s. Although many foreign workers remained in the 
Wohnheime throughout the 1960s, others sought affordable housing as an alternative. As the 
previous section illustrated, this is where the large-scale city planning policy intersected with the 
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decision-making of Turkish immigrants. The only viable option for most migrants looking to 
leave the Heime was the inexpensive housing stock in the city-designated Sanierungsgebiete 
(renovation districts), as it was the future prey of urban renewal and in an undesirable location 
along the Berlin Wall. ‘Guest workers’ joined the working class and elderly residents in the 
broken down housing and a Turkish community on the border of West Berlin emerged. In 1968, 
immigrants made up 6% of the housing stock of the renewal districts; by the end of 1974 that 
percentage had increased to around 37%.108 
Migrants made their own mark on the neighborhoods that the city had designated for 
‘renewal’ as existing urban infrastructures shapeshifted along with the demographic changes. 
The early history of West Berlin’s Hinterhofmoscheen (backyard mosques) is emblematic of this 
bottom-up influence, which happened in conversation with the political and economic forces of 
the city’s Cold War development. Although a later chapter will expand on Islam in Germany in 
the 1980s, it is valuable to introduce the topic here in order to connect early Turkish influence 
with the urban renewal architecture of West Berlin. 
 Turkish migrants came to Germany from a country that Atatürk had secularized during 
his extensive 1920s reforms.109 Although this generation of Turkish guest workers was not 
particularly religious, significant portions of Turkey’s population resented Atatürk’s strict 
secular reforms. Many migrants were practicing Muslims and some even saw their move to 
Germany as an opportunity to connect with their religious practices. There was, however, very 
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little corresponding Muslim infrastructure in Germany at the time.110 In the Islamic tradition, 
these prayer spaces do not have to be ordained as a religious space or organized in any way.111 
This allowed workers to be flexible, finding small spaces to conduct their daily prayer. Some 
companies and dormitories also designated prayer space for their Muslim employees and 
residents. Eventually, demand for more organized spaces appropriate for Friday prayer services 
grew. 
For Turkish migrants, the only readily available parts of the city were often the 
abandoned workshops and basements of the Sanierungsgebiete. And so the derogatory 
terminology “Hinterhofmoschee” (backyard mosque) emerged.112 The Hinterhöfe, loosely 
translated as ‘backyards,’ were the mazes of alleys and courtyards that filled in the dense 
tenement housing blocks. This was the same infamous architectural feature that the design 
establishment categorically rejected during the post-war modernist revival and urban renewal 
campaign. But these rejected spaces were opportunities to repurpose the parts of the city 
accessible to Gastarbeiter. The new Turkish migrant population founded their first mosque in 
1968.113 From the street, these places of worship were not immediately recognizable. One had to 
know where the ‘backyard mosques’ were, or recognize them based upon a small sign adorning 
the outside of the building.  
Even though German society saw Turkish migrants almost exclusively as laborers, the 
slow beginnings of a semi-permanent home began as early as the 1960s. Although many of the 
more obvious future-oriented shifts in the Gastarbeiter community came in the following 
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decade, tensions between theories of rotational recruitment and the actual circumstances of guest 
workers led to community developments that warrant more in-depth academic attention. Initially, 
these changes were largely hidden from view. The Hinterhofmoscheen and the community 
networks forming in the Heime were out of sight; they did not visibly disrupt the rotation 
narrative. Because the Gastarbeiter myth fit with the government’s narrative of progress and 
economic growth, there was very little conflict surrounding their daily presence in factories or 
cities. Historian Rita Chin has argued that “[a]s long as guest workers were not understood as 
immigrants, it was possible to suspend the whole question of difference, or more specifically, to 
explain it away using the language of market expediency and a rationale of mutual benefits.”114 
This changed in the 1970s, when the visibility of Turkish migrant communities unmistakably 
threatened the ‘guest worker’ myth. 
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Chapter 4 
Collapse of the Guest Worker Myth: Housing Discrimination, “Ghettoization,” and 
Resistance in 1970s West Berlin 
 
 The 1970s marked an important transition period for Turkish workers in West Berlin. As 
the illusion of temporariness wore off, Turkish families reunited in Germany and began to set 
down more social and economic roots. But country-wide economic uncertainty and growing 
community ties stoked fears among Germans who perceived threats to their financial security 
and cultural identity. In response to these fears, government officials and community members 
attempted to use urban space as a way to manage cultural difference and lay out an idealized path 
to integration. In many cases, however, migrants formed their own connections to West Berlin. 
Reframing the so-called Turkish “ghettoes” as important cultural enclaves questions the validity 
of the integration narrative popular in the 1970s and 80s.115 This chapter discusses the economic 
and cultural context that framed integration debates, several unsuccessful spatial integration 
tactics, and finally the migrant population’s negotiation with these techniques of power.116  
Introduction: Economic Uncertainty and the Anwerbestopp 
  
 In 1969, the German economy stuttered; after the 1973 oil embargo, the 
Wirtschaftswunder came to a full halt. The economic downturn spurred on by global energy 
uncertainty brought the state’s implicit assumptions about the guest worker program to the fore. 
If the workers’ sole purpose was to fuel the economy, it logically followed that they would return 
to Turkey when the economy weakened. Although the state calculus demanded emigration, 
workers performed their own calculations. Their reaction to financial insecurity was predicated 
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on their uncertain legal relationship with West Germany. Jus sanguini citizenship laws, which 
restricted citizenship status to hereditary ties as opposed to birth on German soil, were at the 
heart of this relationship. Christian Joppke attributes Germany’s steadfast adherence to 
“genealogical” citizenship laws to the country’s Cold War division; if German-ness was defined 
through blood rather than national borders, there was a national unity that overrode the Berlin 
Wall.117 The jus sanguini definition necessarily excluded any foreign workers and their children, 
born on German soil. The migrants from Turkey faced an additional challenge – because Turkey 
was not part of the European Economic Community (EEC), Turkish workers had to consider the 
possibility of not being let back into Germany once they had left the borders of ‘Europe.’118  
Because of this precarious legal position, Turkish workers were afraid of losing access to 
their jobs and new communities. Instead of returning home to visit their families, and risking 
being unable to return to Germany, their families came to them. This ‘family reunification’ 
picked up speed in the early 1970s and refuted a central part of the ‘guest worker’ narrative: that 
the ‘guests’ were all independent young men, unencumbered by the responsibility of partners or 
children. This assumption had made it easier to view people exclusively as workers. In reality, 
many workers that came to Germany through recruitment had made the difficult decision to 
leave loved ones behind in Turkey. As anxieties about their future prospects in Germany, and in 
a politically unstable Turkey, increased, so too did the number of family members who came to 
reunite with the pioneering FRG workers. 119  
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In an effort to enforce some semblance of the original two-year rotation principle, the 
West German government instituted the 1973 Anwerbestopp (recruitment stop). This policy 
officially ended the recruitment of all foreign workers. In the midst of an oil embargo-induced 
financial crisis, the FRG hoped not to stabilize the foreign worker population, but to decrease it. 
However, just as the late 1960s and early 1970s market forces had failed to usher workers 
homeward, so too did the Anwerbestopp. This measure did decrease the number of immigrants in 
the short-term.120 In the long-run, however, it stoked existing uncertainties among the foreign 
worker community and family reunifications continued to increase throughout the 1970s.  
As it became clear that the foreign workers were not just ‘guests,’ but rather immigrants, 
fears surrounding their presence rose. In the minds of many Germans, the Turkish workers had 
transformed not only into economic liabilities, but also into cultural anomalies; their differences 
could no longer be ignored or contained to the Hinterhöfe. The way that German society 
articulated this threat is important. ‘Race’ was an unspeakable characteristic given the country’s 
recent Nazi past. Instead, what historian Rita Chin calls the “racialization of culture” emerged.121 
The rhetoric of the state and public discourse focused on the Turkish population’s cultural 
difference, which they understood to be inherently incompatible with German society. Therefore, 
the government plan beginning in the early 1970s was a strong push towards integration that 
looked very much like one-sided assimilation. 
In the memories of Filiz Y., the Turkish immigrant whose story the previous chapters 
began, this shift in public perception was palpable. In her account of the 1970s she pinpointed 
the distinct shift in climate that occurred after the economic downturns of the late 1960s and 
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1973.122 She experienced the financial crisis not only in terms of fewer job opportunities in West 
Berlin, but also in the way that she was treated in her day to day life. When she first arrived as a 
‘guest worker,’ which was safe and even lauded by German society, she felt respected. In 
December 1964, for example, the Berlin Senate’s Minister of Labor invited Filiz and other early 
guest workers to have coffee and cake. Before they arrived in the congress hall for the meeting 
they went on a guided city tour in a modern bus. Filiz described the general sentiment as: “You 
are guests, we are hosts, that’s how it is!”123 In the workplace, her coworkers helped teach her 
German and were always friendly with her, giving her the nickname “little mouse.”124 But this 
friendly and welcoming atmosphere, which existed when the workers were considered ‘guests,’ 
dissipated once some Germans felt that they had overstayed their welcome.  
Rita Chin has collected evidence of this shift by analyzing the the language of politicians. 
In 1971, for example, one Employers’ Associations representative expressed concern about the 
rising costs of ‘guest workers’ in Germany and specifically noted the “cost of public investment, 
far greater than when foreign workers live here housed in communal hostels.”125 Increasing rates 
of unemployment throughout the country, which disproportionately affected the immigrant 
populations, exacerbated this sense of financial burden on Germany.126  
Fear of a Cultural Other: The Family Unit and Ghettoization 
 
 Growing discomfort with the Turkish ‘cultural other’ played out in the realm of urban 
space. German politicians and media outlets mapped the fear of Turkish ‘guest workers’ onto the 
cityscape through the rhetoric of ‘ghettos’ and slums. Districts with large migrant populations, 
                                                
122 Interview with Filiz Yüraklik, FHXB Digitales Archiv, time stamp: 1:39:30. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Chin, “Guest Worker Migration and the Unexpected Return of Race,” 85. 
126 Chin, “Guest Worker Migration and the Unexpected Return of Race,” 86. 
 49 
like West Berlin’s Kreuzberg, were clear examples of how temporary economic migrants had 
overstayed their welcome and had begun to develop communities. These social ties, especially 
the image of the family, were a threat in a way that single, unattached workers confined to 
Arbeitnehmerwohnheime had never been. In reaction to this fear, the West Berlin city 
government attempted to manipulate urban space as a strategy of integration. One such policy 
tactic was the very direct Zuzugsperre (moving ban), which legally forbade foreigners from 
moving into areas deemed to be ‘slums.’ Other attempts were subtler; the 1977 Strategies for 
Kreuzberg urban planning competition encouraged assimilation among “problematic” Turkish 
populations. This section discusses the government’s theory of integration and why these two 
spatial tactics were largely unsuccessful in supporting the Turkish community’s transition from 
‘guest worker’ to ‘immigrant’ during the 1970s. 
In June of 1971, the West Berlin Senate established a planning team in under the name 
“Integration of foreign workers and their families” (“Eingliederung der ausländischen 
Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien.”)127 Their task was to develop a comprehensive plan for 
integrating ‘guest workers,’ representing the beginnings of an ideological shift away from more 
“differentialist” policies.128 In September of 1972 the team presented their final report to the 
Senate. By this time there were 30,827 Turkish workers living in West Berlin, making up 41% of 
all foreign workers; 20,000 additional Turks fell outside of this worker category, presumably 
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including family members and the unemployed.129 Family reunification threatened to increase 
these numbers further.  
The report’s section on housing focused primarily on the concentration (Ballung) of West 
Berlin’s foreign population, which it perceived as a threat to integration. 130 The report succinctly 
summarized the problem: “Limiting as well as decreasing the concentration = requirement of 
successful integration politics.”131 As practical constraints to this goal, the report listed the state’s 
inability to control who private homeowners rented to, the Turks’ proclivity to Ballung, and the 
Turks’ low motivation to pay appropriate rents for enough room to live.132 Instead of 
acknowledging long-term structural problems or discriminatory housing policies (which the next 
section discusses further), the government commission blamed characteristics they saw as 
inherent to the Turkish population, like a low standard of living. As another example, the 
commission stated that the “Housing problems for foreign workers primarily stem from family 
reunification.”133 The report explicitly problematized the family unit – a ubiquitous trope during 
the 1970s period of family reunification.  
The press and public opinion mirrored the government’s perception of growing foreign 
families and communities as threats. A newspaper article published the same year as the Senate 
committee’s report began with the title “The Turks on the Spree live like they’re in a ghetto”  
(“Die Türken an der Spree leben wie im Ghetto”) and described Turkish children playing in the 
Hinterhof among garbage and debris.134 This focus on children was not accidental – second-
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generation Turkish migrants represented the “liminal” state of the Turkish community and 
insurmountable cultural differences.135 A popular trope was that Turkish children were “illiterate 
in two languages,” implying that they were caught between two cultures. One 1973 newspaper 
article, published in the popular paper Der Stern, was titled “Turks – the N*gg*rs of Berlin: How 
Kreuzberg became a slum through bad planning” (“Türken – die N*g*r von Berlin: Wie aus dem 
Stadtteil Kreuzberg durch Fehlplanungen ein Slum wird.”)136 In the article, a quote from 
Kreuzberg city councilman Hans Hänelt compared the Kreuzberg neighborhoods to the 
predominantly black New York City neighborhood Harlem. Racialized language in the article, 
like “Kümmeltürken” (literally ‘caraway Turks’) and “Türkenpack” (‘Turk pack’ or ‘vermin’), 
signifies the shift that Rita Chin discusses from worker to culturally different immigrant.137  
This same news story also humanized the narrative of demographic change by telling the 
story of 65-year-old Mathilde Donnet, who had lived in her Kreuzberg apartment for 20 years.138 
Large Turkish families had replaced her former neighbors. Now that 18 out of 22 apartments in 
her Lausitzer Straße building had been taken over by immigrants, she felt “lonely in a once in 
familiar environment.” According to a survey cited in the article, Mathilde Donnet was not alone 
in her sense of isolation and fear; 52% of Berliners would have rejected “collegial, friendly or 
familial contact” with Turks, 11% perceived Turkish people as “clean,” and only 6% took Turks 
to be “reliable.”139 Mathilde Donnet’s story reflected the fears of many working class Germans 
living in Kreuzberg – already threatened by the economic downturn, they felt that incoming 
foreign workers were also destabilizing their cultural ties to the city. 
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Figure 7: Cover of Der Spiegel Magazine in 1973: “Ghettos in Germany: One Million Turks”140 
 
A longer 1973 expose that appeared in the center-left magazine Der Spiegel explicitly 
made the connection between physical urban decay and the large number of Turkish families 
living in German cities. On the magazine cover (Figure 7), a large family of immigrants crowded 
together in a dilapidated window behind the title “Ghettos in Germany: One Million Turks.”141 
The corresponding title piece of the magazine issue was even more provocative: “The Turks are 
coming – save yourself if you can” (“Die Türken kommen – rette sich, wer kann.”) This sense of 
impending doom was consistent throughout the piece, which warned of the masses “swarming” 
to West Germany “from the shores of the Bosporus and from the highland of Anatolia.”142 
According to the author, inner-city neighborhoods across Germany had not yet been completely 
destroyed, but the “Harlem-Symptoms” of ghettoization were already visible and were a valid 
warning for remaining German residents to get out while they were still able.143 This analysis 
exaggerated the rate of Turkish families’ growth and ignored the fact that the so-called “ghettos” 
were already dilapidated before foreign families moved in. This sampling of news media 
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demonstrates the increasing fear and paranoia about the future of German cities in the early 
1970s, with a special eye to the growth of the family unit and ghettoization. 
The Problem with Kreuzberg: The Zuzugsperre and Other (Failed) ‘Strategies for Kreuzberg’ 
 
At the same time that this fear of the ‘cultural other’ increased in the public sphere, 
political and community leaders implemented policies to counter the ‘self-segregation’ of 
migrant communities. The political culmination of this mindset was the Zuzugsperre (moving 
ban). Instituted on January 1, 1975 this regulation forbade foreigners from moving into 
neighborhoods that the government had labelled as “Ballungsgebiete” (concentration districts).144 
The government deemed districts with 12% foreign population to be Ballungsgebiete; in West 
Berlin these neighborhoods were Kreuzberg, Tiergarten and Wedding.145 Once again, the 
government rhetoric zeroed in on family reunification and the high rate of reproduction as the 
central factors for ghettoization instead of acknowledging financial limits to mobility or the 
benefits of community building.  
The movement ban for foreigners is especially intriguing in that it marks a shift away 
from the policies of the 1960s. As previous chapters demonstrated, the initial infrastructure for 
the Gastarbeiter was premised on exclusion and isolation. Now the role of the foreign workers 
had changed – they were visible and a threat, and therefore the government strategy vis a vis 
migrant communities shifted to one of dispersal. The Zuzugsperre limited migrants’ freedom of 
movement in order to water down migrants’ visibility and cultural difference.  
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The court system ultimately overturned the Zuzugsperre in 1979.146 Berlin’s Higher 
Administrative Court found the ban to be “unsuccessful, unlawful, and not practical” in 
December of 1979.147 The court had heard eight different cases relating to the restrictions, and 
ruled against the Ausländerbehörde (Foreigners Registration Office). One court case was lobbied 
by a foreign worker whose family had lived in Kreuzberg since 1974, but had recently moved to 
Wedding. Because of his son’s illness and a desire for his old neighborhood, he wanted to return 
to his former home; the Zuzugsperre stopped him. Rather than successfully encouraging 
‘integration,’ the Zuzugsperre placed yet another restriction on foreign workers’ living 
arrangements.  
Around the time that the Zuzugsperre went into effect, changes were happening in the 
urban planning community. Politicians and community members alike recognized the deficits 
inherent in top-down measures that placed little value on community experience. A major 
impetus for this was the 1969-1974 construction of the Kreuzberger Center (Figure 8), a massive 
modernist housing project in the heart of Kreuzberg at Kottbusser Tor.148 The housing complex 
was an example of the Berlin Senate’s overreach; it pushed the development through even 
though borough representatives (Bezirksverordnetenversmmlung) opposed the project.149 The 
building also symbolized “misguided urban development” – there were no windows along its 
entire Northern face because of a proposed highway that never came to fruition.150 The Senate 
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prioritized the highway over the residents’ wants and needs. The NKZ sparked a shift towards a 
more participatory model in the mid-1970s, as the city government reckoned with residents’ 
perspectives and increasing neighborhood activism. The 1977 urban planning competition called 
Strategies for Kreuzberg (Strategien für Kreuzberg), which differed significantly from the 1957 
Interbau expo and the 1960s urban renewal programs, was part of this turning point. 
 
Figure 8 Photo of the New Kreuzberg Center (NKZ) from Adalbertstraße, taken in 1975, one year after completion 
‘Strategies for Kreuzberg’ was a district-focused competition that prioritized the needs of 
the neighborhood over those of the urban planning establishment. The original proponent of the 
competition was Klaus Duntze, a priest in Kreuzberg’s Martha parish. He had witnessed the 
negative influence of the Senate’s growth coalition on the community’s fabric and wanted to 
encourage Kreuzberg residents to advocate for themselves.151 He sought alternatives to the 
“Sanierung” (renovation) partnership between the state and private housing corporations. After 
Duntze discussed his plans with the national church (Landeskirche) and the Senate 
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Administration for Building and Housing, the Senate decided to take over the financing and 
submission evaluation for Strategies for Kreuzberg.152 
The Senate’s leadership contradicted the local participation that Duntze wanted. 
Although the planning commission consisted of a 2:1 ratio of community members to 
government officials, distrust of the Senate plagued the competition.153 Members of the 
commission worried about using funding to tear down the Hinterhöfe, a fear that the government 
only confirmed by demolishing an old gas station and fire station.154 This mistrust, however, 
resulted in lasting institutionalization of community participation in city planning. A discussion 
group that broke away from the main planning commission ultimately evolved into the 
Bürgerinitiative SO 36 (citizens’ initiative SO36), named after southeast Kreuzberg’s zip 
code.155 This group of activists began to publish their own district newspaper in December 1977 
titled Südost Express (Southeast Express) and remained influential for decades.156  
Although most of the winning ‘strategies’ were never executed, the competition built a 
broad coalition of Kreuzbergers who were dedicated to fighting against urban renewal. Highly 
visible actors at the time were the church, politically motivated students who sought inexpensive 
housing, and activist-minded West Germans. This collaboration proved important for the 
squatter movement of the early 1980s, which I will discuss in the next section. But this early 
history of neighborhood activism leaves out two important groups: the inner city’s original 
working class and the Turkish foreign workers. 
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As urban planner Carmen Hass-Klau has noted, most of the “traditional” residents had 
long since moved to other neighborhoods in the face of urban renewal plans and spatial 
isolation.157 Those who remained were much more connected to Kreuzberg’s past as a blue collar 
community than to its present as a hub of counterculture and protest.158 While the number of 
original residents was shrinking, the Turkish population was growing. Strategies for Kreuzberg 
openly acknowledged and sought to work with Turkish residents. The goal of the project was to 
engage all parties in the diverse district, and by the late 1970s the Turkish foreign workers were 
impossible to ignore.159 However, the competition’s language framed this demographic change 
largely as a problem to be solved. Strategies for Kreuzberg wanted to “revitalize” the district.160 
These goals reproduced the trope of the city as a diseased space that needed to be cleansed.161 
This rhetoric carried over from the days of Interbau and post-war modernism. 
Although the competition made progress towards inclusivity, the underlying assumption 
about the Turkish community had not substantially shifted. A brochure that the Senate 
Administration for Building and Housing gave out in 1979 claimed that Turkish residents had 
difficulties connecting to the district’s history, and also had no “perspective for a future” there.162 
Pastor Duntze reiterated this sentiment when he described Turkish communities as having “no 
other relationship to the quarter than this: It provides cheap living space…For them it means 
pure present tense, no past, no future.”163 Later in this same statement, however, Duntze 
contradicted himself. He also acknowledged the existence of a “fully functioning sub-culture 
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with its own meeting points, information systems, and civic organizations.”164 Turkish migrants 
did invest in the future of the community. This investment in West Berlin’s inner city arguably 
played a larger role in urban development than the Senate’s failed manipulations of urban space.  
From Below: Housing Discrimination and Revitalizing Kreuzberg 
 
In order to understand the formation of so-called Turkish “ghettos,” it is necessary to 
view West Berlin’s housing situation not from the perspective of the state but from the 
perspective of foreign workers. It was easy for government reports to tell stories of Turkish self-
isolation and lower housing standards, but this leaves out systemic housing discrimination and 
the failure of urban renewal policies – both of which limited the mobility of Turkish migrants 
and their families. It is also useful to question the inner-city “slums” as inherently isolating. With 
these alternative points of analyses in mind, it is possible to understand Turkish communities as a 
catalyst for change on the border of West Berlin. The familial, social, and economic ties that 
formed in the 1970s threatened the German conception of citizenship and countered the 
government’s definition of ‘integration.’ 
First, it is useful to reconsider the city reports that blamed “slum” formation on Turks’ 
unwillingness to spend more money on nicer housing and their lower standards of living. While 
it is certainly true that most workers and their families could not have afforded expensive 
housing options, this does not indicate any level of satisfaction with, or apathy regarding, their 
less than ideal living situations. In fact, a survey presented to the Berlin Senate contradicted this 
perception. Between February 9th and 20th 1972, Mr. Nezih Manyas conducted interviews with 
119 Turkish workers.165 The report provides valuable insight into the lived experiences of 
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housing in West Berlin. According to the interview summary, none of the respondents were 
happy with their living situations, complaining about the condition of the buildings and high 
rents. If they could have moved elsewhere, interviewees claimed, they would have – but they 
could not afford anything else. One respondent succinctly stated the deficits of the city’s urban 
renewal program: “If we could find housing, it would only be housing that has already been 
deemed unfit for the German population.” The only available option for workers with low 
budgets was to fill in gaps in renewal districts. This housing stock was often run down, and a 
lack of renovation left leaky pipes and notoriously moist and moldy walls.166 These conditions 
were not ideal for anyone – even those who were saving money for remittances or worked a low-
wage job. 
Turkish families also faced widespread, overt discrimination and it was difficult to find 
German landlords willing to rent to them. According to one interviewee, there was a list in the 
Counselor for Turkish Workers that listed select German real estate firms that were willing to 
rent apartments to foreigners.167 Even names on this list, however, had turned away the 
interviewee in the past. Another one of Manyas’ interviewees stated: “I can tell you names and 
address of real estate agents, whose windows have signs that say ‘We don’t broker for 
foreigners’ or ‘We don’t have anything for foreigners.'" These de facto discriminatory housing 
policies did not only stem from the racism of individual brokers – German residents often 
pressured landlords in ‘renewal’ districts to maintain ethnically homogenous rentals. This 
influence often came from single and elderly German renters – the primary demographic of the 
remaining original Kreuzbergers. Although some original residents welcomed the changes in the 
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neighborhood, others saw the demographic shift as an upheaval of values that compounded the 
isolation of their socioeconomic status. Landlords frequently heeded these resident complaints, 
purposefully excluding Turkish tenants from the outset or using renovations as an excuse to evict 
Turkish renters.168 Landlords ultimately factored in the potential threat to their apartments’ 
values when they decided whether or not to rent to Turkish families. For many, it was not worth 
it to risk renter complaints or a negative reputation. 
Once they had managed to rent a home in this hostile market, immigrants often found that 
existing housing regulations challenged their expanding families. One respondent to Manyas’ 
1972 survey explained that many families rented homes that were too small.169 They then had to 
report a smaller number of children to the police than they actually had in order to stay in the 
apartment. These unregistered children were disadvantaged when it came to, for example, 
registering for kindergarten. However, the respondent was convinced that his children would not 
have been accepted into a kindergarten even if they had been registered. In Wedding, the report 
claims, there were more than 2,000 Turkish children on a Kindergarten waiting list.170 This 
impact on children’s education exemplifies the far-reaching effects of housing deficits, and the 
general lack of infrastructure that existed in the neighborhoods with high immigrant populations. 
Despite limiting structural factors, many Turkish workers and families recognized the 
injustice of their living conditions and advocated for themselves in the 1970s. Figure 9 depicts 
Turkish demonstrators in Berlin who participated in a May 1970 demonstration. One sign, 
written in Turkish, reads “Tuvaletli ev istiyoruz” – “We want a house with a toilet.” Much of the 
housing in the renewal districts that landlords were willing to rent to Turks had no bathrooms 
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inside of individual apartments. The toilets were shared, either in the hallway or an outhouse. 
Another sign read “Patrondan yana degil işçiden yana tercuman istiyoruz” – “We want a 
translator for the worker, not the boss.” This sign hints at the difficulties that Turkish workers 
experienced in the workplace, unable to communicate with their bosses at will because of 
language barriers.171 The boss was the one with the translator, presumably granting him control 
over when and how communications took place. These Turkish Berliners were likely taking part 
in a Berlin-wide protest on May 1st, which spanned topics ranging from workers’ rights to the 
war in Vietnam. Housing struggles were on the top of many foreign workers’ minds. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 May 1970 Turkish migrants protest for better living conditions in Kreuzberg172 
 
 Although this protest is just one isolated incident of Turkish engagement with German 
society, there are innumerable examples of migrant resistance during the 1970s. Some of the 
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most compelling examples were not public demonstrations, but rather economic and cultural 
contributions to a growing Turkish community. Turkish residents in West Berlin’s inner city 
brought new opportunities to neighborhoods that had been hemorrhaging business and 
population in the previous decades. One example is the transformation of what is now called the 
“Türkenmarkt” (Turkish market), or Oriental Market. This outdoor street market was originally 
called the Market on the Maybachufer when it was founded in 1887. In the 1920s, the market 
was extraordinarily popular, and 800 stands set up along the bank of the canal every week.173 
The market predictably struggled in the years after WWII and the Berlin Wall only worsened 
circumstances, as it did for many small businesses that relied on patrons from the east side of the 
city. By the end of the 1960s, there were only 20 stands left standing. There was a turnaround, 
however. According to an ethnographic study of the market published in 1988, it had once again 
become the most popular outdoor market in Neukölln.174 What changed during the 1970s and 
early 1980s? Turkish migrants had moved in.  
 In the middle of the 1970s, Turkish workers started to open up their own stands at the 
market (See Figure 10). This process was notably difficult for foreigners. In order to obtain a 
business license, one had to prove either eight years of residence in Berlin or a strong existing 
interest for the business.175  Even for those who had lived in Berlin for the requisite length of 
time, the license was not a given; they also had to prove that the business would not upset the 
existing urban economic balance. Some Turkish stand owners managed to obtain official 
licensure while other skirted regulations by renting stands from Germans. By 1983, 20% of the 
68 long-term stands were owned by Turks. By 1985 the official number increased again to more 
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than 30% of 82 regular stands.176 However, upon paying a visit to the Türkenmarkt in 1985, a 
researcher discovered that Turks were actually running 36 out of 74 stands – almost half.  
 
 
Figure 10 Turkish and German market goers shop at the Türkenmarkt on the Maybachufer177 
 
 Not only did Turkish migrants own and manage businesses alongside their German peers, 
but most of the stands geared their wares towards foreign consumers. Some stands sold 
Mediterranean olives and sheep’s cheese, Turkish bread and tea, lamb, and packaged products 
like chickpeas, legumes and rice that appealed to non-German consumers and were difficult to 
find elsewhere in the city. According to the 1988 report, the fruit stands even avoided selling 
products like strawberries and rhubarb, which did not fit well with the migrant populations’ 
demands.178 This market’s transformation evidences a highly visible economic and cultural shift 
in Berlin’s inner city neighborhoods that quite literally played out on the streets. 
 In an oral interview, Turkish immigrant Zuhal Özver told her own personal history of 
entrepreneurship in 1970s West Berlin. She moved to Germany as a student in 1968 and lived in 
a Charlottenburg dorm. Zuhal chose not to take part in the demonstrations – they just “were not 
                                                
176 Ulrike Spies, Der “Türkenmarkt” am Maybachufer, 4. 
177 FHXB Fotosammlungen 2085/1270 “Fotografien des Wochenmarkts am Maybachufer vom 6. Juli 1979” Jürgen 
Henschel 
178 Ulrike Spies, Der “Türkenmarkt” am Maybachufer, 5. 
 64 
her thing.”179 But she changed West Berlin in another way. She met her husband in the student 
dormitory, and the two of them noticed that there were very few cultural activities for Turks to 
engage in.180 They decided to make a change. In April 1974 they opened up their first Turkish 
language movie theatre on Kreuzberg’s Dresdener Street. In preparation for the opening they 
stuck flyers into mailboxes on streets they knew to be primarily Turkish.181 They further 
attracted this crowd by serving Turkish snacks at the theatre during intermission.182 According to 
Zuhal, they gained a lot of success within the community and even opened up another theatre in 
Wedding in 1977.  Zuhal’s story is one of many, but it displays the entrepreneurship of Turkish 
immigrants in the 1970s. From the changing market on the Maybachufer to Turkish language 
movie theatres, Turkish immigrants were shaping West Berlin’s development trajectory.  
Despite these strides in the public sphere, many Turkish Berliners lived in dilapidated 
housing. The urban renewal programs had failed to revolutionize the tenement neighborhoods of 
West Berlin – this is where the squatter’s movement stepped in. The Strategies for Kreuzberg 
competition had planted the seeds of bottom-up spatial activism in the minds of many residents, 
and between 1979 and 1983 this manifested itself in the unlawful occupancy of many dilapidated 
neighborhoods buildings. The goal of squatting was generally to renovate houses while living in 
them, completing the projects that the city government and the housing companies never 
accomplished. In many cases, squatter hoped to save the buildings from demolition.  
The ‘squatters’ are usually depicted as bohemian students or young artists – 
representatives of the Berlin counterculture that was flourishing at the time. But one of the first 
instances of squatting in Kreuzberg was actually executed almost entirely by Turkish and 
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Kurdish immigrants.183 It took place on Forster Straße, a small two-block street in Kreuzberg36 
that stretched between the Landwehr Canal and Görlitzer Park. Turkish families had begun to 
move onto the street in the early 1970s. Although the street had a reputation for being a 
“Türkenboulevard” (Turk-boulevard), the area was a diverse mix of original residents, 
immigrants, and students. Some houses were primarily Turkish due to their exceedingly poor 
conditions, others were mixed, other landlords purposefully kept their buildings German – and 
some houses stood completely empty.  
But the empty buildings were not simply abandoned; the city had bought them and 
evicted the residents, planning to expand the Paul-Dohrmann-Schule that was housed in Forster 
Straße 15.184 In order to complete the project, almost the entire block was earmarked for 
demolition. In the years following the proposal, Turkish and German residents collaborated to 
start a tenants’ group to protest the construction. However, the negotiations between the Senate 
and the residents fell through in 1980. That November, squatters, most of whom were Turkish, 
took over occupancy of Forster Straße 16 and 17. Most of the squatters moved from house 18 
next door, where the apartments were overcrowded.185 As Figure 11 shows, they hung signs 
outside of the house in both Turkish and German, declaring “yikmaya Karsiyiz evleri 
terketmeyecegiz” (“We will not abandon homes”) and “Kein Abriss! Wir bleiben drin!” (“No 
demolition! We will stay inside!”)  
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Figure 11 Signs in Turkish and German outside of the Forster Straße squat186 
 
This takeover succeeded, and the Berlin Senate gave the tenants’ group temporary rights 
to the house. Turkish families officially had the capacity to divide and manage the building as 
well as organize repairs.187 As the reparations commenced from the inside, the city of Berlin bore 
the costs of repairing the roof and operating expenses. The residents took financial responsibility 
for other projects, including building toilets and baths inside of the house.188 As the signs 
hanging from the side of the Forster Straße building indicate (Figure 10), the squat was also an 
opportunity for Turkish residents to assert their identity on the streetscape. One Turkish woman 
responsible for initiating the squat remarked upon the “breakfasts and festivals on the street.”189 
This same squat participant also reflected on the collaboration among students and 
Turkish residents, as well as the communication and support the residents found among other 
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squats. The tenants kept these partnerships alive by founding an intercultural day nursery in the 
ground floor of the occupied buildings. This daycare sought to break down the neighborhood 
divide between migrants and native Germans.190 German kids joined the primarily Turkish-
speaking kids of migrant backgrounds from Forster Straße 16, 17 and 18 to form a class of 
around 30.191 The Berlin Senate financed the daycare as a “parent-initiative-daycare” and the 
school opened its doors in February of 1982. After almost three years of operation, the Senate 
finally legalized the “self-help contracts” that the tenants had signed, solidifying the future of the 
daycare, which still exists on the next block over to this day. 
These instances of protest, and of forming economic and social community bonds, 
display the undeniable influence that migrant workers and families had on the development of 
West Berlin. They also problematize labelling the neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln as 
“ghettos.” In fact, these districts were extraordinarily diverse. The fact that German 
policymakers and media labelled these “slums” as barriers to integration when they were largely 
means of integration exposes the restrictive definition of belonging that they were working with. 
In comparison to the workers’ dormitories, Turkish families in West Berlin were much more free 
to develop family ties and relationships with neighbors and start small businesses. They could 
make their presence known on the street. These factors were all ways to tie immigrants to their 
new home. Bringing attention to these successes is not to understate the factors working against 
the migrants. Rather, analyzing their resistance exposes the very societal and legal limitations 
that they were fighting against; the unsatisfactory housing conditions, the discriminatory 
landlords, the difficulty obtaining business permits.192  
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Chapter 5 
Integration, Religion, and Advocacy: Participatory Urban Planning in Theory and in 
Practice 
 
‘Gastarbeiter’ in 1980s West Berlin 
 
 In October 1982, the recently inaugurated West German chancellor Helmut Kohl met 
with UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Both represented political shifts to the right in their 
respective countries; Kohl was part of the more conservative Christian Democratic party and 
Thatcher stood at the helm of the Conservative Party. According to notes taken during their 
meeting, which the British National Archive recently declassified, Kohl broached his plan to 
decrease West Germany’s foreign population.193 He singled out the Turkish population as 
problematic. The scribe present at the meeting quoted Kohl: “Germany does not have a problem 
with the Portuguese or the Italians, even the Southeast Asians, because these communities 
integrate themselves well. But the Turks come from a very different culture.”194 It was 
insufficient for Kohl to prevent additional Turkish immigrants from entering Germany. Instead, 
he voiced his plan to halve the Turkish population.  
 In the almost ten years since the 1973 recruitment halt, the Turkish population had only 
continued to increase. Families reunited, new families grew, and chain migration made asylum 
seekers from an unstable Turkey likely to seek refuge in West Germany.195 The West German 
economy had not improved since the oil crisis of the 70s and an unemployment rate of around 
4% held steady until around 1982, when a recession sent the percentage of unemployed up to 
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around 7.5%.196 Kohl felt pressure to free up scarce jobs for German citizens, but the rhetoric 
was no longer solely about economic gains and losses. 
Kohl’s Christian Democratic party had begun to develop a platform that contrasted with 
the Social Democrats’ strategy of “mutual integration.”197 Immigrants who retained any cultural 
differences, CDU members claimed, could never really be German – and were thus a threat to 
Germany’s national identity.198 As a visible non-European and non-Christian ‘other,’ the CDU 
singled out the Turkish population as unassimilable; the Turkish slums in cities across the 
country were the realization of this difference.199  
A year after Kohl’s meeting with Thatcher, the West German Parliament passed a 
repatriation law (Rückkehrförderungsgesetz). The legislation provided a monetary incentive of 
10,500 German marks, plus 500 marks per child, to any foreigner returning home.200 The offer 
was valid until June 30, 1984 but relatively few people took advantage of the government’s 
proposal. By the time the offer expired, only approximately 100,000 Turks out of the 1.5 million 
living in West Germany at the time had returned to Turkey. One 1985 article from the popular 
newspaper Die Zeit hints at some of the reasons that Chancellor Kohl’s goal of halving the 
Turkish population was ultimately unsuccessful. For one, although the unemployment rate 
among Turkish West Germans was disproportionately high at around 15%, this was still lower 
than Turkey’s overall unemployment rate of 20%.201 Even if Turks were having difficulties 
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finding work in West Germany, the situation ‘at home’ was not much better. Leaving Germany 
also meant losing things that migrants had worked hard to attain, like a long-term retirement 
fund. 
 The Rückkehrförderungsgesetz underscores the extent to which Turkish workers were 
seen as cultural outsiders.202 Although many Turkish workers had been German residents for 
more than a decade, they were legally foreigners (because of Germany’s strict citizenship laws) 
and perceived to be culturally unassimilable. 203 In the midst of the economic and social 
disruption that plagued West Germany in the 1980s, the Turkish ‘other’ remained a ‘problem’ 
for a newly elected Christian Democratic government to solve. A significant part of what set the 
Turkish minority apart was their identity as religious ‘others.’  
Although the history of Islam in West Germany is complicated and contains much more 
nuance than can be possibly be expressed in this section, an overview will be useful to briefly 
contextualize the case study that follows. 204 Islam first appeared in German cityscapes beginning 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as an increase in Muslim workers from Turkey required space 
to practice their religion.205 As the second chapter discussed, Muslim residents often established 
prayer spaces in nontraditional, unused urban spaces such as factories or apartments. These were 
called “Hinterhofmoscheen” (backyard mosques).  
During the 1970s and 1980s the number of mosque congregations increased sharply; in 
the 1970s, 193 new congregations were founded, and in the 1980s the number of new 
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congregations rose to 386.206 According to the 1987 census, there were 1.3 million Muslim Turks 
and around 280,000 other Muslims living in Germany at the time.207 These mosques served not 
only as a place for communal Friday prayers, but also as community centers. Although Turkish 
immigrants and their families were not the only Muslims living in Germany, the mosque 
communities and larger associations were typically culturally homogenous. It was therefore 
common for Islamic organizations to meet the cultural needs of the Turkish immigrant 
community.208 They were often meeting places for families and sites for giving advice and for 
passing along religious knowledge.209 For immigrants, these religious communities were often a 
sign of deepening roots and connections to Germany. 
As more mosques developed, they sought rights as communities. Germany’s constitution 
includes provisions for recognized religious communities. If a group can obtain this public law 
status, they gain access to a wealth of resources they otherwise cannot receive. This not only 
includes financial subsidies from the state, but also the ability to include religious lessons in 
public schools and other public institutions.210 Muslim organizations began to lobby the state to 
obtain this status in the 1980s. 
This trend played out in West Berlin as well. In 1980, a group of 26 associations founded 
the Federation of Islamic Organizations and Congregations in Berlin.211 Leaders of the 
organization advocated for Muslim residents of West Berlin, and one of their central goals was 
teaching about Turkish culture and Islam in public schools. The year of its founding, the group 
wrote to the Berlin Senate multiple times to express this wish, and in February of 1981 a lawyer 
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wrote to the Senate on the Federation’s behalf.212 The Senator of Education responded with a 
rejection; his primary reason for the denial was that the Federation was not an officially 
recognized religious community. He also noted that tensions could arise between the values of 
the German constitution and Islamic religious schooling.  
These questions were certainly on the Senate’s mind. While the Islamic Federation was 
arguing for their status as an official religious community, the Senate had commissioned a study 
titled: “Influences of the Islamic religion on the ability of foreign workers and their family 
members to integrate.”213 The report stated that “[t]he tendency of ghetto formation can only be 
understood as a replacement for real integration,” implying that community ties were so strong 
because they could not find sufficient support elsewhere.214 The report also emphasized the 
community ties of Islam and deemed it to be more public and communal than Christianity, citing 
the extent to which it influenced everyday life.215 Beyond these assumptions, the Berlin Senate’s 
investigation did bring up the nuances of diverse sects and congregations in West Berlin’s 
Muslim community. It also acknowledged the multiplicity of Muslim immigrants’ experiences, 
including increasing secularism among some and increasing religiosity among others.216 But 
most importantly, within the context of West Berlin’s mission of integration, the report indicates 
that the Berlin Senate and academics were seriously questioning how Islam would affect the 
potential integration of a growing Muslim population; the consensus was that it would be a 
challenge to overcome. These connections between integration and Islam surface in the analysis 
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that follows, which tells the story of a wide range of community actors negotiating the visible 
spaces that defined Kreuzberg.   
The International Building Exhibition of 1984/7: Successes and Shortcomings of 
Participatory Planning 
 By the 1980s, the urban planning establishment and the Berlin city government had 
transitioned away from Kahlschlagsanierung (demolition) and towards a more cautious strategy 
of urban renewal.217 The squatters movement and community agitation had proved resilient even 
in the face of the CDU administration’s attempts to oust illegal settlements, and the city was 
forced to legalize many of the squats.218 The Berlin Senate institutionalized this value-shift 
towards preservation in 1982 when it passed the “Twelve principles of cautious city 
development.” These guidelines celebrated the unique character of the inner-city as well as 
commended community participation in the re-development process.  
The government-sponsored 1984/7 International Building Exhibition, often called IBA, 
was an attempt to ground these values in practice. This grand architectural expo was similar in 
pomp and circumstance to the post-WWII Interbau but differed in both mood and locale.219 
Interbau had optimistically served as a model for rebuilding a modern Berlin from the ground up; 
a top-down apparatus guided the carefully planned, prototypical communities. IBA, on the other 
hand, emphasized a tradition of citizen participation that had its roots in the squatter and self-
help movements, as well as in the Strategies for Kreuzberg competition discussed in the previous 
chapter. And while IBA’s 1980s reincarnation did include plans for new buildings, a guiding 
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slogan was “The inner-city as residence.”220 Instead of rejecting the tenements of the inner-city 
as unlivable, as Interbau had, IBA sought to unify West Berlin’s architectural past with its future. 
To serve this goal, IBA included an entire division focused on restoring old buildings. 
The head of this IBA Altbau (IBA Old construction) division was Hardt-Waltherr Hämer, an 
architect who had long been committed to renovating old housing stock.221 Hämer saw tenement 
housing as an important part of West Berlin’s city fabric and thus championed a new policy 
called cautious urban renewal (behutsame Stadterneuerung). In language that mirrored that of 
the extremely influential Jane Jacobs, who is known for saving New York City’s Lower East 
Side from destructive urban renewal policies, Hämer praised the cultural livelihood of the inner 
city’s streets.222 He saw value in the unique “Kreuzberger Mischung” (Kreuzberg mix), a 
convergence of diverse cultural and social attributes that made Kreuzberg stand out from the 
neatly relegated functionalism of post-war modernism.223  
It is unsurprising, although often overlooked, that another part of IBA Altbau’s mission 
was integration.224 The planning process for the expo began in the late 1970s, as the discourse 
surrounding ‘guest workers’ was shifting into the socio-cultural domain.225 Immigrant 
populations made up significant portions of the inner-city neighborhoods and had historically 
been left out of the planning process. IBA’s participatory model seemed like an ideal way to 
engage these unheard voices. Urban planning was once again a means for politicians to interact 
with foreign populations and dictate integration policy.226 Urban space, particularly the relevant 
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issue of housing policy, was a way for the local government to assertively frame the “problem” 
with Kreuzberg in a politically expedient manner. 
The IBA was a very high-profile event and its status was also tied to Berlin’s 750th 
anniversary event. Therefore, it was a chance for the city to publicly reassert a positive image of 
the city that transcended societal unrest and the counterculture movement.227 It was no longer in 
vogue, however, for the political and urban planning establishments to speak for the entirety of 
West Berlin. Instead, IBA focused on buzzwords like “dialogue” and “diversity” that 
acknowledged some of the conflict within the city.228 According to historian Emily Pugh, the 
IBA was, like the post-war Interbau exhibit, largely a success in terms of drawing global 
attention to West Germany’s innovation.229 The exhibit drew a lot of media buzz in the 
international architectural arena. But at home in West Berlin, many who lived in the target 
neighborhoods critiqued the outcomes; the squatters’ qualms had not been settled.230 IBA’s 
“aesthetic” changes did not significantly impact the way that the housing market functioned, nor 
did they alter systematic inequalities.231   
Art historian Esra Akcan’s multi-scale history of IBA, which attends to “noncitizen” 
residents as well as policymakers, recounts another perspective of the Senate-directed 
exhibition.232 Her detailed ethnographic research, which entailed interviews with many Turkish 
residents of Kreuzberg and IBA leaders, concludes that many IBA Altbau participants rejected 
the general discourse about the dangers of ‘ghettoization.’ For example, when the Senate 
instituted the Zuzugssperre, it dictated that foreign residents in Berlin’s neighborhoods should 
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ideally be limited to 10% of the population. However, when modernizing Kreuzberg’s housing 
stock, IBA Altbau made a concerted effort to make only the changes that the residents could 
afford in order to avoid displacing these populations.233 During construction, residents were often 
able to move into neighboring units or buildings to minimize disruption to their families. IBA’s 
attempts to slow gentrification and keep Turkish families in their existing communities starkly 
contrasts with the Zuzugsperre’s logic, which sought to disperse the city’s ghettos.  
In order to make these decisions, Altbau workers set up meetings in every building that 
they worked on, inviting tenant advisors, residents, and translators to the open discussions.234 
This was remarkable – in Turkish architect Cihan Arin’s 1980 assessment of the renovation 
district, he noted that only one Turkish-run organization, “Otur ve Yasa” (Housing and Living), 
provided any explanation of renters’ rights or urban renewal to the Turkish community.235 Other 
German groups, like SO 36, provided some support in this area but lacked sufficient resources 
for the task at hand.236 Another important detail of IBA Altbau construction was that the needs of 
individual families significantly influenced building renovations; the current tenants were the 
priority, not theoretical residents down the line. Because of this, there was no universal 
renovation model for apartments and many IBA Altbau projects retained unique characteristics. 
Akcan does note, however, that the participation of Turkish families was primarily 
limited to these house-level meetings.237 They did not typically engage in the larger-scale 
projects that impacted the entire community. In these cases, IBA Altbau’s participatory structure 
more effectively reached the already involved activist and student populations.238 The following 
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section addresses how IBA and Kreuzberg’s district government reacted to Turkish voices and 
cultural difference. 
Religion and Integration: Görlitzer Bahnhof’s Unrealized Turkish Cultural Center  
 Among the Turkish voices involved in IBA, those of Kreuzberg’s working class are the 
most difficult to find. They frequently participated in the tenant meetings that Azcan described 
but were more reluctant to engage publically with West Berlin’s urban planning bureaucracy. 
One instance, however, stands out as an exception: Görlitzer Park. Analyzing this unique case, 
which pushed IBA’s participatory apparatus to its edge, reveals the limits of the Turkish 
community’s input. Although IBA Altbau claimed to celebrate diversity and dialogue, when 
Turkish citizens voiced their desire for a mosque and cultural center in Kreuzberg’s Görlitzer 
Park they were met with rejection. This rebuff makes sense in the context of West Germany’s 
skepticism surrounding the cultural “other.” According to the guiding logic of the time period, 
cultural difference, including religion, acted as a barrier to integration.239 It is, however, possible 
to reframe this fight for a cultural and religious touchstone as a means of integration into the city 
rather than one of isolation and difference.  
Görlitzer Bahnhof was an abandoned train station in eastern Kreuzberg, only a few long 
blocks away from the Berlin Wall, that had languished unused since WWII. The idea to 
transition the unusable station into a park had been around since the 1950s, but the city had been 
preserving the land in hopes of building a highway that never came to fruition.240 The idea came 
to the fore during the Strategies for Kreuzberg competition in the mid-1970s, but bureaucratic 
barriers had always been in the way. IBA seemed like the right time for the project to finally 
come to fruition.  
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In 1982, a Kreuzberg district parliament resolution founded the working group Görlitzer 
Bahnhof to take charge of the transition.241 Members of the working group included district 
politicians from all parties, resident initiatives like SO36, and IBA representatives.242 The 
committee members knew they wanted to transform the train station into a large park, providing 
green space that the neighborhood lacked. In order to make sure that everyone in the 
neighborhood could “identify with the Park,” the working group emphasized the importance of 
resident participation and used the motto: “The Görlitzer Park is for everyone!”.243 This fit with 
IBA’s model of participatory planning. As the park planning progressed it became clear that the 
working group was more interested in the theory of resident participation than the practice, and 
their goals for the park were mostly set in stone from the outset. Although 40% of the residents 
neighboring the Bahnhof were Turkish, the IBA committee and local urban planning 
establishment often discounted voices of the immigrant working class when it came to making 
important decisions.  
The first conflict surrounded creating community gardens in the park. The Neighborhood 
Association Forster Street (Nachbarschaftsverein Forsterstraße), the group of Turkish and 
German residents who participated in the squat discussed in the previous chapter, wrote to the 
working group Görlitzer Park in October of 1983 to voice a request: the Turkish members of the 
neighborhood association were particularly interested in having a gardening area in Görlitzer 
Park that could be tended by about 20 neighborhood families.244 However, when a Forster Street 
representative voiced this desire at an October symposium, the response was: we are glad to hear 
Turkish voices participating, but we absolutely do not want to turn the train station into a “big 
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allotment.”245 The working group Görlitzer Park held fast to its initial plan for an open and hilly 
landscape free of any particular “service offerings,” like a garden.246 They maintained this plan 
despite community interest in a community garden - something quite common in many German 
cities. 
Although the working group had effectively quashed the proposed gardens, a new 
discussion about a potential Turkish cultural center arose that proved harder to deny. 
Representatives of a mosque that was already located on the Bahnhof initiated these negotiations. 
The Fatih-Congregation, a religious group associated with Berlin’s Islamic Federation, had 
occupied a storage shed at the site of the former Görlitzer train station (see Figure 12) in August 
of 1981 because their prior space, like many other ‘backyard mosques,’ was too small.247 
According to a newspaper article from that year, members of the Islamic Federation put 1,700 
hours of work and 60,000 marks into transforming a former potato storage area into a prayer 
space.248 By 1984 the new, larger mosque at the former train station had over 100 regular visitors 
and thousands during important holidays.249  
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Figure 12: Fatih Moschee on the Görlitzer Bahnhof site, pictured in 1983 
 
The Fatih-mosque was not ready to evacuate, and at first it appeared they might not have 
to. The first public discussion about the train station’s future took place in February of 1984, and 
the “overwhelmingly German” attendees of the meeting, alongside some representatives of the 
mosque, voted that the Fatih-mosque should be able to stay on the land.250 There was even 
discussion about constructing a new building to house the growing congregation. Even at this 
meeting, though, there were some dissenting voices. One attendee from the working group 
Görlitzer Bahnhof reminded everyone that the mosque had been “besetzt” (occupied).251 Another 
attendee ironically stated that it would be too much of an “annoyance” (Belästigung) to have a 
mosque so close to homes; he ignored the fact that many of the “backyard mosques” were in fact 
located in tight quarters inside tenement apartments or storefronts.252 
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At this point, a new collection of community voices entered the debate: AG Ausländer 
(working group foreigners), part of the neighborhood organization SO36. Two-thirds of the 
group were Turkish, and most were well-educated and politically engaged Kreuzbergers.253 They 
wanted to represent the interests of Turkish residents who were not engaged in the planning 
process.254 This working group was interested in the proposals of the Fatih-mosque, but many 
members were skeptical about letting the mosque take the reins on the project. The Fatih-
congregation was part of the larger Islamic Federation, a group that had a reputation for being 
further to the right than the members of the AG Ausländer. The AG came up with a new plan 
that they hoped could represent the Turkish community at large: building a Turkish cultural 
center with an attached prayer space. For the members of the AG, including Turkish tenant 
advisor Özcan Ayanoglu, the center would primarily serve as a site of identification.255 It was a 
way to stabilize the diverse Turkish community and provide younger generations with a 
connection to their culture.256  
When the AG Ausländer presented their proposal during a March of 1984 town hall 
meeting, the “German” reaction was almost universally “defensive.”257 Many attendees 
immediately suggested that, while they did not necessarily want to stop the cultural center 
altogether, it should be located elsewhere. A suggestion for another location, at Moritzplatz, 
disappointed the Turkish representatives at the meeting – the Fatih-mosque’s congregation did 
not live near this alternate site. Despite some immediate pushback from the urban planning 
apparatus, AG Ausländer met with representatives of the Fatih congregation the following 
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month, hoping to solidify common ground between the two groups’ different visions for the 
park.258 After a lot of debate among interested Turkish parties, the broad coalition submitted a 
proposal for a “Cultural Center with Prayer Space” to the IBA competition in June of 1984. 
In retrospect, members of AG Ausländer saw this submission as momentous. The groups 
that came together to work on the project had extremely different political and religious 
orientations, and this was likely the first time that such a broad group of Turkish organizations in 
West Berlin had unified for a singular purpose.259 The final project proposal included a cultural 
center and mosque that were adjacent, but distinct, entities. The buildings were to include a large 
gathering space in the mosque; five small rooms for learning, advising, crafting, playing and 
conducting language courses; and two small libraries.260 Architecturally, it was important for the 
structures to be well integrated with both the neighborhood and the park, while making sure that 
the cultural identification of buildings’ outside matched that of the inside.261 In the end, the 
organizers foresaw the entire complex occupying only 10,000 square meters out of the 140,000 
square meter Görlitzer Bahnhof.262 
The district committee held a special meeting in July of 1984, where most of the 
interested parties came together: AG Görlitzer Park, IBA representatives, local government 
representatives, AG Ausländer, and members of SO 36.263 At this meeting the “German” 
political and urban planning representatives unified against the project, leading the Turkish 
parties (who often disagreed ideologically) to feel unified in the face of what they perceived to 
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be discrimination. The day after the meeting, the working group Görlitzer Park decided to pre-
emptively remove the project proposal from the IBA competition.264  
The trajectory of the cultural center illuminates some of the deficiencies of participatory 
planning in Kreuzberg. In a 2011 interview, AG Ausländer member Özcan Ayanoglu reflected 
on the dynamic between the Turkish representatives and the German-led committees as 
fraught.265 As long as the Turkish community voices concurred with the German committees, 
Ayanoglu remembers, the committees were happy to listen. However, as soon as the AG 
Ausländer laid out the plan for the cultural center, the administrative bodies of the City Planning 
Office or the Senate Administration for Urban Development rejected the plans outright.266 
In February and March of 1985, Özcan Ayanoglu and other members of AG Ausländer 
decided to forge ahead with the community discussions that they had started. They wanted to 
find out whether the cultural center was necessary, and what function it could serve in the 
neighborhood. The report they compiled revealed the diverse opinions of Turkish political 
organizations, religious groups, and families. While most of the people the AG interviewed 
supported some form a cultural center with a prayer space, what this step meant for each 
individual was different. A representative from the Türkischer Bund in Berlin (Turkish Union in 
Berlin, or BTT) emphasized the center’s symbolic nature, signaling “that we (we as Turks) are 
here.”267 Someone from the Türkenzentrum (Turkish center, TZ) emphasized that it wasn’t 
enough to have a representation of cultural harmony – the center would have to be a place for 
serious discussions and cultural exchange.268 A member of the Progressive Volkseinheit der 
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Türkei (Progressive Union of Turkey, or HDB) feared that the Turkish community was not read 
to make this communal step because they were just beginning the phase of dialogue.269 A 
representative of Komkar (Federation of the Working Associations from Kurdistan in the FRG) 
expressed his hope that Islam could bring diverse groups together, including the Kurdish 
members of Komkar.270  
Interviews with families from the neighborhood also revealed personal investment in the 
future of the project. One family member wanted a Hammam (steam bath) like they had in 
Turkey, because their family had to bathe publically in the city bath houses.271 They also wanted 
Koran courses for their children, as it was hard to find somewhere with empty space in the 
neighborhood. They imagined working in a garden attached to the center, growing food to 
provide at these courses. The AG also interviewed a Kurdish Kreuzberg resident who feared that 
the Turkish community would not always accept fellow Kurds, but also saw potential for 
dialogue; “For all of us…there should be a cultural center,” they remarked.272 
These diverse responses among Turkish residents, as well as the divides between the AG 
Ausländer and the Fatih-Moschee that surfaced earlier in the analysis, reveal the diverse ways in 
which migrants understood their identities in the city. There was no widespread agreement 
among the Turkish residents in Kreuzberg as to what defined a ‘German’ Turk273 – some felt that 
religion unified them all, some felt that religion isolated them from their community, others felt 
that the only way to express their identity was through visible reference to Turkey. Although the 
AG’s report exposed many of the differences within the Turkish communities, and emphasized 
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the difficulty of coming to an agreement (especially about the religious role of the community 
center), the ultimate conclusion was to hold fast. The AG and the coalition were unwilling to 
compromise and move the center elsewhere. 
Although the cultural center never came to fruition, due both to organizational difficulties 
on the part of the Turkish community and bureaucratic barriers on behalf of the IBA and West 
Berlin’s local government, this case study nonetheless reveals shifts occurring in 1980s 
Kreuzberg. Groups who had never before worked together collaborated towards a common goal, 
and local leaders made their voices heard. Although these diverse opinions had different goals, 
most everyone involved sought some physical, and visible, connection to the Görlitzer Bahnhof. 
A representation of belonging was at stake in the physical design of the Kreuzberg park. As the 
neighborhood changed, Turkish voices continued to make their mark on the cityscape.  
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Epilogue: Reflections on Integration and “German” identity 
 
 When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and thousands of East Germans streamed in from the 
former Eastern bloc, Germany reasserted to the world what it meant to be “German.” As 
sociologist Rogers Brubaker has noted, the former Cold War opponents were, without hesitation, 
accepted as citizens of the Federal Republic.274 This welcoming stance threw the Turkish reality 
into harsh relief. Turkish so-called ‘guest workers’ who had been living in West Germany for 
decades, and their children who were born on German soil, were less “German” than the 
incoming East Germans and the refugees from the Eastern bloc.275 According to popular 
conception, Turks were still part of a “parallel society” that, while spatially within Germany, had 
a completely separate identity.  
 In its structure, this thesis has nominally mirrored the notion of a parallel society; the 
chapters distinguish between the “German” spatial evolution and the lived experiences of Turks 
in West Berlin. My analysis, however, complicates the notion of a “parallel society” at its core. It 
is impossible to understand Germany’s history without the ‘guest workers’ just as it is impossible 
to understand the history of Turkish communities in West Berlin without understanding the 
evolution of the city itself. Starting in 1961, in the isolated Heime, Turkish immigrants have been 
undeniably entangled with German politics, culture, and history. The role of ‘guest workers’ was 
never exclusively economic – it was never limited to factories or supporting the 
Wirtschaftswunder. 
 It is too simple to assess the identity of an entire immigrant population by a simple 
“success” or “failure” to integrate – especially when it is impossible to define the desired form of 
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integration from the outset. Looking at country-level immigration policy, naturalization rates, 
and unemployment statistics can never stand in for understanding how an immigrant population 
relates to the immigrant-receiving country. As this project has shown, Turkish workers were able 
to influence their surroundings in West Berlin, and build spaces they felt comfortable in and 
could identify with, without conforming to the norms of integration that the city governments 
and German society expected and aimed for.276 These processes happened in constant relation to 
the institutions and residents of West Berlin, not in a vacuum or a completely isolated “parallel 
society.” Landmark historical events are often taken at face value. By analyzing them from 
multiple perspectives, the ‘myths’ that stand in for more complex stories start to unravel. 
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